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1 Introduction
In the following four chapters, distinct but related experimental research ana-
lyzing strategic and non-strategic economic behavior is presented.
Chapter 2, entitled “Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner’s
Dilemma Games” is a systematic study of behavior in symmetric and asymmet-
ric prisoner’s dilemma games. The prisoner’s dilemma is one of the key models
in many disciplines for now over five decades. Previous prisoner’s dilemma ex-
periments show that in contrast to theoretical predictions, cooperation rates are
generally very high in the symmetric payoff variant of the game. Chapter 2 studies
cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma in a more realistic scenario by systemat-
ically analyzing the effects of asymmetric payoffs. Already in the early nineties
(Murnighan et al. 1990, p.181) noted that “research has been inexplicably absent
on the effects of asymmetry”. The present study takes this concern into account
and focuses on this much broader type of conflict expanding the limited and rather
unsystematic research conducted in this area. It analyzes and discusses the effect of
asymmetry on cooperation in a 40 period prisoner’s dilemma game in fixed partner
design. A distinction is made between a high and low payoff symmetric prisoner’s
dilemma on the one hand and an asymmetric game combined out of both sym-
metric ones on the other hand. Asymmetry significantly decreases cooperation, as
low-type players are more likely to defect after mutual cooperation while high-type
players initiate cooperation more often than the former. Asymmetry also has a
significant negative effect on the stability of cooperation rendering long sequences
of mutual cooperation extremely rare. These results are not only a valuable addi-
tion to the existing (mostly symmetric) prisoner’s dilemma literature but are also
of relevance for understanding reciprocity, equity and fairness especially in light
of recent theoretical developments based exclusively on symmetric experimental
games.
Chapter 3, entitled “Assignment versus Choice in Prisoner’s Dilemma Exper-
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iments” compares behavior in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game when players
can choose between two different representations of the same prisoner’s dilemma,
to behavior when players are assigned to play a specific game. The chapter is con-
cerned with the methodological question of the external validity of experimental
research based on the assignment of participants to experimental games or decision
situations.
Experimental findings may systematically misrepresent field outcomes if assign-
ing participants to experiments has an impact on the decisions made by the partic-
ipants in the experiment and if such an assignment does not occur in the field. The
chapter therefore analyzes to what extent experimental deviations from actual sit-
uations due to the assignment of participants is based exclusively on the possibility
of self-selection or sorting, or whether choice has an important behavioral effect
in itself. The chapter extends the results obtained in the experimental psychology
literature by analyzing whether choice effects are also found in strategic contexts,
rendering them of particular interest to economic environments. Based on the idea
that choice either via active modification of the strategic environment or by passive
self-selection into a particular strategic environment may be an important property
of many empirical problems studied using experimental methods, the research goal
is to separate a choice effect from sorting or self-selection effects.
The experimental results clearly indicate that the mere fact that participants can
choose the game they want to play has a statistically significant impact on behavior.
Cooperation rates are up to 60% higher in the games that were not assigned to but
chosen by participants. These findings are consistent with the robust evidence of
the psychology literature on non-strategic contexts that choice increases motivation,
trust, and performance. Given that in many contexts agents choose the strategic
situation they get involved in, assigning participants to experiments may affect the
external validity of some experimental findings.
Chapter 4, entitled “The Role of Rivalry - Public Goods versus Common-Pool
Resources” moves from the 2 person prisoner’s dilemma game structure to the
analysis of behavior in a 4 person quadratic public good and a quadratic common-
pool resource game.
Despite a large theoretical and empirical literature on public goods and common-
pool resources, a systematic comparison of these two types of social dilemmas
is lacking. In fact, there is some confusion about these two types of dilemma
12
situations. As a result, they are often treated alike. An explicit example of this
is provided by (Gintis 2000, pp.257-258) who argues that while “common pool
resource and public goods games are equivalent for Homo Oeconomicus, people
treat them quite differently in practice. This is because the status quo in the
public goods game is the individual keeping all the money in the private account,
while the status quo in the common pool resource game is that the resource is not
being used at all.”
In line with the theoretical literature, the chapter first establishes theoretically
that public good and common-pool resource games as used in the experimental
literature are two distinct types of social dilemmas, the fundamental difference be-
tween the two games being the degree of rivalry. It is shown that the distinguishing
feature of these two types of games lies in the distributional factor that determines
whether the good is rival or non-rival. This difference gives rise to two distinct
strategic environments. Based on these theoretical differences an experiment is
devised that tests whether the theoretical differences have an impact on behavior.
The results show that participants clearly respond to the differences in rivalry.
Aggregate behavior in both games starts relatively close to Pareto efficiency and
converges quickly to the respective Nash equilibrium. This clearly indicates that the
differences in rivalry affect behavior, strengthening the importance of differentiating
between the two types of games. Despite this difference reflecting the structure of
the two games, there appear to be some behavioral similarities. In both games,
aggregate behavior starts in the neighborhood of the Pareto optimum and moves
rather quickly to the respective aggregate Nash equilibrium.
Chapter 5 entitled “Purchase Decisions with Non-linear Pricing Options under
Risk” moves away from a strategic game setting to an analysis of decisions under
risk. The chapter reports on an experimental investigation of purchase decisions
with linear and non-linear pricing under risk. Standard economic theory suggests
that customers should be indifferent to the format of a price reduction. In par-
ticular this implies that one would expect a customer to switch from one pricing
scheme to another (one supplier to another) as long as there is at least an expected
reduction in the effective purchase price. The recent surge in the use of rebates,
discounts, bonus and point schemes implemented by retailers but also observed in
other levels of the production chain begs the question of whether traditional eco-
nomic explanations do fully account for the increased usage of non-linear pricing
13
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methods. An understanding of potential behavioral reasons for using such pricing
schemes - as presented in this chapter - may not only be relevant for their design,
but also for wider policy considerations.
The experiment presented is based on a single period stochastic inventory prob-
lem with endogenous cost. It extends classic binary lottery experiments to test
standard decision theoretic predictions concerning purchasing behavior in a rebate
and a discount scheme. The question to what extent customers continue to pur-
chase under two mathematically isomorph formats of non-linear schemes even if
switching to a linear pricing scheme is optimal is investigated. The results indi-
cate that rebate and discount schemes exert a statistically significant attraction
on customers. Given the increased role of non-linear pricing schemes, systematic
deviations from optimal behavior are an important element in the design of such
schemes and may raise consumer protection and competition policy issues. The
chapter concludes with a discussion on how the results can be explained by deci-
sion heuristics.
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2 Cooperation in Symmetric and
Asymmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma
Games
Abstract: The chapter discusses the effect of asymmetry on cooperation in a 40
period prisoner’s dilemma game in fixed partner design. A distinction between a
high and low payoff symmetric prisoner’s dilemma and an asymmetric game com-
bined out of both symmetric ones is drawn. Asymmetry significantly decreases
cooperation, as low-type players are more likely to defect after mutual cooperation
while high-type players initiate cooperation more often than the former. Asymme-
try also has a significant negative effect on the stability of cooperation rendering
long sequences of mutual cooperation extremely rare.
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2.1 Introduction
The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is an important model in economics, psychology,
political science, sociology and biology as well as other disciplines for now over five
decades. Previous PD experiments show that in contrast to theoretical predictions,
cooperation rates are generally very high in the symmetric payoff variant of the
game. The present paper studies cooperation in the PD in a more realistic scenario
by systematically analyzing the effects of asymmetric payoffs.
Almost all studies investigating the PD are designed in such a way that payoffs
are identical for both players.1 Asymmetry is, however, an important property
of many economic and non-economic problems. Most real world interactions en-
tail different outcomes for each player, even if all players choose cooperatively.2
The same obviously applies if all decide non-cooperatively. Already in the early
nineties (Murnighan et al. 1990, p.181) noted that “research has been inexplica-
bly absent on the effects of asymmetry”. The present study focuses on this much
broader type of conflict expanding the limited and rather unsystematic research
conducted in this area. We modified the symmetric payoff matrix in such a way
that both the cooperation and the defection payoff for player i is either larger or
equal to that of player j. We therefore depart from the standard approach to
study social interactions characterized by conditions of symmetry and equality. A
systematic analysis of the asymmetric PD is not only a valuable addition to the
existing (mostly symmetric) PD literature but it is also of particular relevance for
understanding reciprocity, equity and fairness especially in light of recent theoret-
ical developments based exclusively on symmetric experimental games (see, e.g.,
Fehr & Schmidt (1999) or Fehr & Schmidt (2003)).3
An important implication of asymmetry is the increased complexity of the game
1See Flood (1958) for the first experimental analysis of the game that at the same time is also
an exception to this rule.
2Asymmetry plays an important role in various areas spanning from, for instance, competition
policy questions surrounding collective dominance or cartel stability issues (see Friederiszick
& Maier-Rigaud (2007)) to governance questions surrounding collective action problems and
the management of common-pool resources (see Ostrom (1990)).
3See also Hennig-Schmidt (2002) and de Jasay et al. (2004) for a critique of the “symmetry”
approach.
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that is likely to induce dynamics that are absent in symmetric settings. Referring
to the classic strategy tournaments by Axelrod (1984), (Murnighan 1991, p. 464)
writes:
“Axelrod (1984) found that certain strategies (tit-for-tat) effectively
train an opponent to choose cooperatively. As a result, both parties do
well and the likelihood that they will fall into mutual non-cooperation
is minimized. Axelrod posits that similar results as found in the two-
person, symmetric, iterated games would follow from games that satisfy
PD’s requirements even if the players’ payoffs differ. Findings on asym-
metric PD’s question the generality of Axelrod’s claim.”
According to Murnighan, asymmetric dilemmas require much more complicated
negotiations than typical PD games. The dilemma no longer consists of a relatively
simple choice between the risks of mutual cooperation and the regrets of mutual
defection. The complexity of the game adds more dynamic considerations. Pairs
who can implement schemes of alternations do much better in increasing their pay-
offs while simultaneously reducing the temptation to defect. As a result, the main
hypothesis of this paper is that asymmetry reduces cooperation rates. Asymmetry
also adds to the problem of cooperation the problem of reaching a mutual under-
standing of what a desirable outcome is. Given these considerations and given
relatively stable and high cooperation rates in symmetric iterated PD games, the
main hypothesis of this paper is that asymmetry reduces cooperation.
Asymmetry in PD games is not a well-defined concept, though. There is not
only an infinite number of combinatorial possibilities but asymmetry can also be
introduced in some cells only or in a design where no player has consistently higher
payoffs than the other in each cell (c.f. Murnighan et al. (1990), and Murnighan
& King (1992)). Finally, including negative payoffs adds an additional factor.4 As
the review of the literature on asymmetric PD games in Section 2.3 will show,
cooperation rates are not easily comparable: not only do the payoff parameters
vary across studies but also the number of repetitions, the matching protocol, the
remuneration and the justification for the asymmetry presented to participants. As
4According to Kahnemann & Tversky (1979) and Tversky & Kahnemann (1981), negative pay-
offs can have a substantial impact.
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Lave (1965) and others have shown, these factors can have an important influence
on cooperation rates.
Given the problems of comparability, we chose a comprehensive experimental
design to systematically compare behavior in symmetric and asymmetric situations
(SYM, ASYM respectively) and to study the impact of asymmetry on dyad-level
dynamics.
We analyze two symmetric and one asymmetric PD game played repeatedly with
a fixed opponent over 40 periods under perfect information. In SYM, we consider
two symmetric treatments with HIGH and LOW payoffs for both players where
the payoffs in LOW equal 2
3
of the payoffs in HIGH. ASYM is an asymmetric
combination of both symmetric games where player i gets the high payoff and
player j the low payoff of the SYM treatments.
We observed 70.00% cooperation in LOW, 59.17% in HIGH and 38.75% in
ASYM, a substantial difference between treatments. Cooperation patterns remain
unstable roughly until period 10 before stabilizing at a rather high level of about
80% in LOW, and 65% in HIGH. In ASYM, cooperation gradually rises to about
55%. The general finding that cooperation is increasing over time is in line with
other studies (Rapoport & Chammah (1965), Lave (1965), Murnighan & King
(1992), Brenner & Hennig-Schmidt (2006)).
As hypothesized, asymmetry indeed substantially decreases cooperation rates,
pointing towards the higher complexity of the game, whereas symmetry has a
positive effect on mutual cooperation. We also find that high-type players initiate
cooperation more often than low-type players. Defection by low-type players, possi-
bly motivated by the aim to equalize payoffs, is more readily tolerated by high-type
players. With respect to the stability of cooperation, we find that asymmetry has
a negative impact rendering long sequences of mutual cooperation extremely rare.
Low-type players are more likely to defect after mutual cooperation than high-type
players.
In addition to the hypothesized effect of asymmetry on cooperation, we also find
that the stability of mutual cooperation under symmetry is higher once it has been
reached, i.e. mutual cooperation (CC) is followed by CC more often in SYM than
in ASYM.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the
games studied. Section 2.3 reviews the relevant experimental literature on sym-
18
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metric PDs and the limited experimental literature on asymmetric PDs. Section 2.4
gives a detailed description of the experimental design and the experimental pro-
tocol. Section 2.5 presents the results and section 2.6 concludes with a discussion
of the main findings.
2.2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Table 2.1 presents a typical 2-player matrix game in normal form where i denotes
the row and j the column player. This game is a PD if and only if the following
conditions are met for both player i’s and j’s payoffs:
ak > bk > ck > dk (2.1)
and
2bk > ak + dk∀k = i, j (2.2)
The second condition goes back to (Rapoport & Chammah 1965, p.34) who pro-
posed it in the context of iterated (symmetric) PD’s in order to eliminate the
possibility of simple alternation between DC and CD providing higher payoffs
than mutual cooperation thus removing the dilemma.5
The formal presentation in table 2.1 is more general than the presentations
usually found because it also accounts for asymmetric payoffs. In symmetric games,
the indexed payoffs are equivalent to each other such that e.g. ai = aj = a ∨ i 6= j.
It is well known that both players defecting is the unique Nash equilibrium of
the one-shot PD game. Applying the logic of backward induction, Luce & Raiffa
(1957) showed that the unique Nash-equilibrium outcome in the finitely repeated
PD game under perfect information is again the one in which both players defect
in every single period. In fact, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is both
players defecting in all periods.6
5There exist several experimental studies with iterated PD games that violate this assumption
and thereby no longer allow a separation of effects due to asymmetry or payoff maximization
through simple alternations. In the experiment by Lave (1965) and by McKeown et al. (1967)
the condition is violated for one of the players. Murnighan et al. (1990) and Murnighan &
King (1992) implement so-called asymmetric dilemmas knowing that a subset of the games
discussed violates the condition either for one or for both players.
6For an overview of the theoretical literature see Binmore (1992) or Osborne & Rubinstein
(1994).
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Table 2.1: General 2× 2 prisoner’s dilemma game in normal form (PD)
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate (bi, bj) (di, aj)
Defect (ai, dj) (ci, cj)
Note that the first element of the payoff vectors refer to the row player.
The general formulation of the PD makes no restriction as to symmetry or
asymmetry of players’ payoffs. The asymmetric PD can be operationalized in
many ways as long as at least one of the payoffs ai to di differs from aj to dj in
table 1. Our present study assumes ai > aj, bi > bj, ci > cj, di = dj = 0, that is,
the payoffs of player j are 2/3 of the payoffs of player i. The parameters are given
in table 3.2.
Table 2.2: Experimental parameters
HIGH
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate (12,12) (0,18)
Defect (18,0) (6,6)
LOW
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate (8,8) (0,12)
Defect (12,0) (4,4)
ASYM
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate (12,8) (0,12)
Defect (18,0) (6,4)
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2.3 Experimental Research on Symmetric and
Asymmetric PDs
Almost all studies investigating the PD analyze symmetric situations and only few
studies are devoted to asymmetric settings. In the following subsection, we first
refer to some relevant experimental work on symmetric PDs. In subsection 3.2, we
will give an overview of the experimental literature on asymmetric PD games.
2.3.1 Experimental Research on Symmetric PDs
Rapoport & Chammah (1965) conducted a series of laboratory experiments in
which participants played a PD game repeatedly over 300 periods. Depending on
the parameters of the game, overall cooperation rates varied between 26.8% and
77.4%. The authors found mutual cooperation in 53% of all dyads and more than
23% in the last 25 periods. Mutual defection took place in 17% of the dyads. Co-
operation in the first period varied between 45% and 70% decreasing in the second
period to 35% - 65%. Inquiring into the dynamics of the decision process, Rapoport
and Chammah found cooperation waning in the first half of the experiment. There-
after, cooperation increased to roughly the level at the beginning of the experiment
with mutual cooperation rising steadily. The authors attribute this phenomenon to
the fact that “Learning goes both ways in Prisoner’s Dilemma. First the subjects
learn not to trust each other; then they learn to trust each other” (p. 201).
Studies on the PD with a much lower number of periods and restart effects show
that average cooperation levels start relatively high between 40%-60%; and then
gradually decline over time.
Selten & Stoecker (1986) investigated behavior in a prisoner’s dilemma game
where 35 participants played 25 supergames consisting of a ten-period PD in
stranger design.7 The most common pattern of behavior was initial periods of
mutual cooperation followed by an end effect involving an initial defection that
was then followed by non-cooperation in the remaining periods. The end effect
is defined as at least four consecutive periods of mutual cooperation with no fur-
ther cooperation following the first defection thereafter. A very striking result is
7Parameters are ai = aj = 145, bi = bj = 60, ci = cj = 10, di = dj = −50.
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the emergence of the first defection. Players start to defect earlier and earlier in
subsequent supergames so that cooperation unravels from the end.8
Andreoni & Miller (1993) analyze a 10-period PD in partner design repeated 20
times with changing the co-player each repetition.9 They also study how people
behave if they have a 50/50 chance to meet a computer player playing a tit-for-
tat strategy. Average cooperation rates start relatively high at around 60% and
subsequently decrease until a sharp end effect is observed. Looking at the first
period of defection over the 20 supergames there is a clear tendency for cooperation
to last until later periods.
Maier-Rigaud & Apesteguia (2006) analyze a 20-period PD in partner design.10
Average cooperation started at almost 70% and declined to below 30% in the first
three periods. It rose to approximately 60% and then declined more or less steadily
throughout the game to approximately 20% in the last period. Overall cooperation
was 33%.
For surveys of the experimental literature on symmetric PD games, see Lave
(1965), Rapoport & Chammah (1965), Oskamp (1971), Roth & Murnighan (1978),
Roth (1995) and Ledyard (1995).
Despite the high number and large variation in experiments implementing the
symmetric PD game our results are generally in line with the cooperation rates, the
development of cooperation and the end game behavior found in that literature.
2.3.2 Experimental Research on Asymmetric PDs
There is only a small literature on asymmetric PD games exhibiting a substantial
variation in experimental conditions.11
8For an extensive discussion of the paper see Roth (1995).
9Parameters are ai = aj = 12, bi = bj = 7, ci = cj = 4, di = dj = 0.
10Parameters are ai = aj = 400, bi = bj = 300, ci = cj = 100, di = dj = 0.
11The first PD experiment by Flood and Dresher (c.f. Flood (1958)) assumed asymmetry in the
diagonal and in d, i.e. bi 6= bj , ci 6= cj , di 6= dj , but ai = aj , i.e. ai = aj = −1, bi = 0.5,
bj = 1, ci = 0, cj = 0.5, di = 1, dj = 2.
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Schellenberg (1964) ran symmetric and asymmetric experiments.12 Two series of
experiments of 20 periods each were conducted where participants were rewarded
by course credit.
In the first series of experiments, participants played against “stooges” that
either followed an initially cooperative and increasingly non-cooperative strategy
or an initially non-cooperative and increasingly cooperative strategy. The main
finding based on the first series of experiments is that participants are more coop-
erative in the high-type player role and less cooperative in the low-type player role
in the asymmetric game, the symmetric baseline game yielding cooperation rates
in-between. In the series of experiments where no “stooges” were used Schellenberg
did not find higher cooperation rates for high-type players. Schellenberg explains
this interaction effect by the low cooperation of low-type players compared to the
baseline. The second series of experiments did not yield statistically significant
differences between symmetric and asymmetric games.
Sheposh & Gallo (1973) ran symmetric and asymmetric experiments.13 Partic-
ipants played for real money. The authors hypothesized cooperation in the asym-
metric treatment to be less than in the symmetric treatment. In particular, low
levels of cooperation were expected from participants with lower payoffs as minimal
cooperative play is the only option to minimize payoff disparity.
80 participants played the game for 50 periods with feedback information on
payoffs in each period.
The asymmetric game produced less cooperative behavior than the symmetric
game (31.1% vs. 39.2%). Low-type players cooperated significantly less than high-
type players (25.1% vs. 37.1%).
The authors then conducted a data analysis in terms of the conditional proba-
bilities of one player’s response in a given period as a function of the other player’s
choice in the preceding period. Were participants concerned with relative out-
comes and did they try to avoid being surpassed by the other player? The smaller
12Parameters are ai = aj = 5, bi = bj = 3, ci = cj = 1, di = dj = 0 in the symmetric treatment.
Asymmetry was obtained by multiplying the payoffs of one of the players by two, i.e. ai = 10,
aj = 5, bi = 6, bj = 3, ci = 2, cj = 1, di = dj = 0.
13The parameters in the symmetric treatments are ai = aj = 5, bi = bj = 4, ci = cj = 1(−2),
di = dj = 0(−3). Asymmetry was obtained by multiplying the payoffs of one of the players by
three, i.e. ai = 5, aj = 15, bi = 4, bj = 12, ci = 1(−2), cj = 3(−6), di = 0(−3), dj = 0(−9).
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amount of cooperation in the asymmetric treatment was attributable to the sig-
nificantly lower proportion of cooperative moves by participants in the low-type
position. Sheposh and Gallo’s tentative interpretation is that participants’ concern
centered on the relative payoff rather than absolute personal gain. Low-type play-
ers consequently avoided cooperative play in order to reduce other’s actual payoffs.
Participants were less concerned with the notion of increasing their own payoffs
than with redressing the imbalance caused by the asymmetrical structure of the
game.14
Talley (1974) conducted several experiments with 168 participants each under
various combinations of asymmetry and information. Asymmetry was created as
in Sheposh & Gallo (1973) by multiplying the payoffs of one of the players by
three. Treatments varied also with respect to information concerning others’ pay-
offs, i.e. symmetry or asymmetry was not always known. Results indicated that
full information enhanced cooperation in the symmetric games, while it reduced
cooperation in the asymmetric games. In particular, lower overall cooperation in
the asymmetric game was attributable to lower amounts of cooperation by low-type
players.
Croson (1999) compared behavior in a symmetric and an asymmetric PD game.
80 participants were divided into 4 treatments, two of them involving a regular
symmetric PD game and two an asymmetric one.15 Participants played 5 games
each, 2 of them being the above mentioned PD games in a stranger design. Croson
considers asymmetry in all cells, i.e. ai > aj, bi > bj, ci > cj, di > dj. Participants
were informed about their payoffs at the end of each period and were paid at the end
of the session. Cooperation in the symmetric treatment was rather high with 77.5%.
Cooperation in the asymmetric treatment was lower amounting to 62.5%. There
was, however, no significant difference between high-type and low-type players.
The next papers focus on asymmetry without comparison to symmetric situa-
14This is our reading of the paper because the claim that “subjects were concerned less with the
notion of winning more money than their opponent than with the notion of preventing their
opponent from surpassing them” (p. 332) is unclear. It is not clear how low-types could avoid
being surpassed by high-type players without defecting. Not being surpassed is a first step
for low-types on the way to higher relative profits and the two motives can therefore not be
distinguished.
15Parameters are ai = aj = 85, bi = bj = 75, ci = cj = 30, di = dj = 25 in the symmetric and
ai = 95, aj = 75, bi = 85, bj = 65, ci = 40, cj = 20, di = 35, dj = 15 in the asymmetric game.
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tions.
Murnighan et al. (1990)16 conducted a series of asymmetric dilemma experiments
only a few of which were asymmetric PD‘s.17
Participants in the experiment were students whose course credit depended on
their performance in the game. No monetary payments were involved. Participants
in three studies played in three-person groups and subsequently as individuals.
They were allowed to exchange anonymous messages after the second period. The
groups played the game between 8 and 20 periods, not knowing beforehand when
the game would be terminated.18 Based on our calculations, overall cooperation
was 54%. Excluding the game where player type could not be consistently defined
over all cells, low-type groups defected 45% and high-type groups 55% of the time.
In Murnighan & King (1992), nine different asymmetric dilemmas are consid-
ered only three of which fulfill the iterated PD condition and consequently are
asymmetric PD games.19 Participants had full information on all outcomes and
communication was allowed. Based on our calculations, and aggregated over all
three asymmetric PDs, cooperation rates were 64% over the first 8 periods (84% if
the first two periods are excluded).
In Charness et al. (2007), asymmetric PD games are discussed although the focus
of the paper is on two-stage modified PD games (coordination games) consisting
of a first round where players simultaneously choose binding non-negative amounts
to reward the counterpart for cooperation and a second round consisting of an
asymmetric PD game.
Aggregate cooperation rates in the three control sessions not containing a first
16The experiment and the results are also reported in King &Murnighan (1988) and in Murnighan
(1991).
17All asymmetric PD games involved identical off-diagonal cells with ai = aj = 40 and di =
dj = 0. One game implements bi > bj , with bi = 32 and bj = 21 but ci < cj , with
ci = 2, cj = 19 and the other three bi > bj and ci > cj with bi, ci = 30, 24; 24, 22; 28, 24
and bj , cj = 28, 20; 22, 4; 24, 4 respectively. The respective games are Game 2 and 3 from the
second experiment and Game 8 from the third. The game where player type could not be
consistently defined over all cells is Game 4 of the second experiment.
18Note that the probabilistic nature of the game also affects the game theoretic prediction.
19All three games (called HIGH/HIGH in the paper) involved identical off-diagonal cells with
ai = aj = 40 and di = dj = 0. One game implements bi > bj , with bi = 36 and bj = 24 but
ci < cj , with ci = 18, cj = 20 and the other two bi > bj and ci > cj with bi, ci = 36, 4; 36, 32
respectively and bj , cj = 24, 20 each time.
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stage compensation mechanism are 15.8%, 17.5% and 10.8% for Game 1, 2 and 3
respectively.20 Player types and pairing were randomized in each of the 25 periods
of the game.
In Andreoni & Varian (1999), the first analysis of compensation mechanisms in
the PD, the experiment consists of a 15-period asymmetric PD game21 (in a give-
some, take-some decomposition) followed by 25 periods of a two-stage modified PD
game.22 The aggregate cooperation rate in the relevant first 15 periods is 25.8%.
Cooperation rates, however, differ significantly by player type. Players in the low-
type position cooperate 16.7% of the time while the cooperation rate of high-types
is 29.2%.
The next papers analyze asymmetric dilemma games that violate the iteration
condition. Although technically not PD games, a brief discussion of the main
findings is relevant to the present study given the alternation patterns observed.
Lave (1965) ran a symmetric and an asymmetric experiment where asymme-
try was obtained by multiplying the payoffs of one of the players by 2.5 in case
of mutual cooperation.23 Participants played for 50 consecutive periods and no
communication was allowed. Even though computer players were used in some of
the treatments, participants were paired with each other in the asymmetric ses-
sions. Lave found a decline of cooperation from 57.5% to 50% when comparing the
symmetric with the asymmetric treatment.
Analyzing individual behavior, Lave observed three cooperation strategy pat-
terns. In the first one, participants stayed with the CC pattern and were not
concerned about asymmetry. In the second pattern, participants alternated be-
tween CD and DC to get an expected value of 2.5 each. Finally, one pair settled
on the optimal way of gaining equal payoffs: they played CC for five periods and
DC in the sixth period achieving an expected value of 10
3
. In most cases, however,
20The parameters are ai = 52, aj = 60, bi = 40, bj = 52, ci = 28, cj = 24 and di = dj = 8 for
Game 1, ai = 40, aj = 60, bi = 32, bj = 52, ci = 20, cj = 24, di = 4 and dj = 8 for Game 2
and ai = 52, aj = 44, bi = 44, bj = 36, ci = 32, cj = 28, di = 8 and dj = 0 for Game 3.
21The parameters are ai = 9, aj = 11, bi = 6, bj = 7, ci = 3, cj = 4 and di = dj = 0.
22Note that the end of the game was presented as probabilistic (15-25 periods) in the instructions,
thereby affecting the game theoretic predictions. Furthermore, players were rematched every
period.
23The parameters are ai = aj = 10, bi = 2, bj = 5, ci = cj = −3, di = dj = −5.
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participants apparently failed to understand each others’ signals and had great
difficulties to settle on some stable cooperation strategy. Lave read participants’
choices as being concerned about equal payoffs. They tried to achieve equality even
though they had to pay a great deal of money to do so.24 With costly unilateral
defection (d < 0), and asymmetry in the CC cell (bj > bi), alternating patterns
became very salient for participants concerned about equal payoffs.
According to the global summary of results in Murnighan et al. (1990), in par-
ticular taking into account the 10 additional games not being PD’s, participants
rarely fell into a deficient series of non-cooperative outcomes. They instead used
the off-diagonal payoffs to increase the outcome of the low player by simple or
complex patterns of alternation. They implemented what Pruitt (1981) termed
“integrative solutions”. The low-type player j chose cooperatively most of the
time, yet defecting regularly. This was tolerated by the high-type player i who
chose cooperatively in every period. Thus, they jointly gained more than they
would otherwise have been able to had they decided competitively. Murnighan
(1991) states that arriving at complex alternation patterns requires a series of cog-
nitive discoveries. Players that do not loose much if both players defect must first
discover their “power” and realize how to use it to increase their payoffs. If they
succeed to establish such a pattern of complex alternation they also establish less
temptation for either player to defect because they both would loose. Implement-
ing complex integrative solutions was certainly facilitated by allowing players to
communicate. This was further corroborated by Murnighan & King (1992), who
found that cooperation was rare when communication was not allowed. Provid-
ing bargainers with information on possible strategies was clearly important for
evoking alternations. Discovering complex alternation schemes was difficult. Once
discovered and implemented, complex alternation was stable. Defections were rare
compared to mutual cooperation.
McKeown et al. (1967) conducted an experiment operationalizing asymmetry in
all but the CC cell, with ai > aj, bi = bj, ci > cj, di > dj.
25 Participants received
24That participants in experiments may be willing to do so has also been shown by Gu¨th et al.
(2003).
25The parameters are ai = 110, aj = 200, bi = bj = 100, ci = −150, cj = 50, di = −200, dj = 20.
Note that for consistency, we reversed the labels of player i and j. In McKeown et al. (1967)
the i player was the low-type player.
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feedback on the scores of every single period but did not get a cumulative score.
Participation in the experiment fulfilled course requirement, thus no monetary
payments were involved. Participants first played in the low-type position and
then in the high-type position against a dummy over 100 trials. It was stressed
in the instructions that they were playing in the weaker/stronger position. Their
analysis showed that when participants are in the role of the low-type player, they
are significantly more cooperative than in the role of the high-type player. Given
that payoffs in the CC cell remain the same, such a result could also be explained
by the fact that DD results in higher relative payoffs for the high-type player. In
addition, the low- and high-type position was switched during the game, rendering
complex patterns unnecessary to recalibrate outcomes.
Overall the number of asymmetric PD games analyzed experimentally is ex-
tremely limited. Most studies do not establish symmetric benchmarks, suffer from
insufficiently many independent observations or involve pre-programmed strategies
rendering general conclusions on the effects of asymmetry difficult. The follow-
ing section presents a comprehensive experimental design aimed at systematically
comparing behavior in a symmetric and an asymmetric PD setting.
2.4 Experimental Design
Our experiment is based on a 3 × 1 design running two symmetric (SYM) payoff
treatments (HIGH) and (LOW) and one asymmetric treatment (ASYM). See table
2 for the payoffs chosen in our design.26 HIGH is the normal form game already
studied by Pruitt (1967) and Pruitt (1970) with ai = aj = 18, bi = bj = 12,
ci = cj = 6, and di = dj = 0. LOW is characterized by generally lower payoffs with
ai = aj = 12, bi = bj = 8, ci = cj = 4, and di = dj = 0.
In both treatments, b = 2c, and a = 3c. Moreover, aHIGH
aLOW
= bHIGH
bLOW
= cHIGH
cLOW
= 3
2
.
ASYM is the asymmetric game where player i (player j) has the same payoffs as
both players have in HIGH (LOW). In that sense, ASYM is a composition of both
symmetric games.
The experiment was conducted at the Experimental Laboratory of the Univer-
sity of Bonn. It was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher (1999)) using a modified
26In all experiments we used the neutral labels A and B, instead of cooperate and defect and the
requirements for iterated PD’s were satisfied (equation 2 above).
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version of the program by Maier-Rigaud & Apesteguia (2006). At the beginning of
each session, participants were randomly assigned to one of the 18 computer termi-
nals. Before the session started, participants first had to read the instructions (see
Appendix A.2), and then had to answer test questions to check if they understood
the game they were about to participate in (see Appendix A.3). The experiment
was started once all participants had correctly answered all test questions. On
the decision screen participants could see the game in normal form, that is the
two choice options A and B, their own highlighted payoffs and the payoffs of their
counterpart (see Appendix A.2). Feedback information on own choice, choice of
the other, period, remaining periods and payoff in the period as well as total payoff
was given after every period. At the end of the experiment participants had to give
reasons for their decisions in a questionnaire (see Appendix A.4).
In all treatments, it was common knowledge that participants played the same
game against the same opponent for 40 periods. In each treatment, we had nine
independent observations.27 We chose 40 periods in partner design to enable the
development of cooperation over time. In particular, we wanted to study whether
asymmetry continues to be relevant in later periods of the game or whether it can
be viewed as an initial complication loosing importance over time.
A total of 2 × 9 × 3 = 54 students mainly majoring in law or economics partic-
ipated in the experiment. The experiment took 40 minutes on average. Taler (the
experimental currency) were transformed into Euro at the exchange rate of 1 Taler
= ¤0.04.28 The average payoff over all treatments was ¤12.44.29
27Throughout the paper, the two players playing together over the 40 periods are also termed a
dyad or a group.
28At the time the experiment was run ¤1.00 roughly corresponded to $1.00 Purchasing power
was, however, higher.
29Average payoffs range from ¤10.92 in LOW, ¤11.06 in ASYM to ¤15.33 in HIGH. Low-type
players received on average ¤9.28 and high-types ¤12.85. In comparison to payoffs under
mutual cooperation low-types achieved 72.5% and high-types 66.9% compared to 85.3% in
LOW and 79.8% in HIGH.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Cooperation Rates over Time
We first describe behavioral tendencies in the three treatments. Over all periods,
we observe 70.00% cooperation in LOW, 59.17% in HIGH and 38.75% in ASYM.
We found unstable patterns of cooperation and defection until roughly period 10
with cooperation in ASYM declining to 15%. Cooperation then stabilizes at a
rather high level of about 80% in LOW, and 65% in HIGH. In ASYM, cooperation
gradually rises to about 55% until period 33. In all treatments, we see an end effect
starting in period 38 (see figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Cooperation rates in ASYM, LOW and HIGH.
Aggregated over all treatments (3× 9 = 27 independent observations), coopera-
tion amounts to 61.11% in period 1, declining to 42.59% in period 2. After period
8, cooperation recovers and varies around 60% until period 38. In the last two
periods, we observe the well-known end-game effect.
Appendix A.1 gives a detailed account of all dyads in all three treatments.
Stability of cooperation is higher in the symmetric treatments (HIGH and LOW)
than in ASYM. Long-lasting cooperating dyads are characterized by long ranges
on the CC-line, i.e. on the x-axis. The stability of the cooperation rate in LOW
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from period 16 to 37 in figure 2.1 is due to polarization. Appendix A.1 shows that
these periods are characterized either by mutual cooperation (7 dyads) or defection
(2 dyads).
Long sequences of mutual cooperation (i.e. more than 20 periods) are extremely
rare in ASYM (1 dyad). The idea that mutual cooperation is less desirable in
ASYM also shows up in the answers given in the final questionnaire. As a reason
for the choices made, one player for instance states: “Alternating between A and
B was the most effective decision for both players.” Another participant states
the goal “to maximize profits under the condition that both players receive equal
payoffs”.
2.5.2 Comparison of Cooperation Rates
In this subsection, we are interested in how asymmetry affects cooperation. It has
been pointed out in the literature that players may try to even out the asymmetric
payoff structure and aim for equal payoffs (Lave (1965), Murnighan et al. (1990),
Murnighan & King (1992), and de Herdt (2003)). If this were indeed the case for
both players then a complicated alternation strategy of full cooperation for the
high-type player (i) and defection of the low-type player (j) on every fourth move
should be observed. But even if such a complicated pattern is not observed players
may (try to) alternate between cooperation and defection to get more equal payoffs
than by mere cooperation and higher payoffs than by mutual defection. Such
behavioral patterns would lead to lower cooperation rates in ASYM. We therefore
hypothesize that asymmetry leads to lower cooperation rates.
RESULT 1: Asymmetry leads to lower cooperation rates.
SUPPORT: Pooling the data of the symmetric conditions LOW and HIGH and
comparing it to ASYM, we find that cooperation rates in ASYM are substantially
lower. A Mann-Whitney U test, comparing the cooperation rates in the respective
9 ASYM and 18 SYM groups results in a significant finding (p ≤ 0.047; one-
sided). An additional Mann-Whitney U test for a detailed comparison yields that
cooperation in LOW is significantly higher than in ASYM (p ≤ 0.047; one-sided).30
30A similar result is obtained using a Fisher-Pitman permutation test yielding a significant result
for SYM vs. ASYM (p ≤ 0.035; one-sided) and for LOW vs. ASYM (p ≤ 0.031; one-sided).
HIGH vs. ASYM yields (p ≤ 0.095; one-sided) and no significant result is obtained comparing
LOW vs. HIGH (p ≤ 0.519; two-sided). See Kaiser (2007) for a description of the Fisher-
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2.5.3 Analysis of Dyads
Our main focus in this subsection is on in-dyad dynamics. We first investigate how
mutual cooperation is affected by asymmetry and payoff structures. We then study
the behavior of player types over treatments.
Strategic interactions in our three treatments are summarized in tables 2.5 -
2.3. Column 1 shows the four possible choice combinations of both players. The
first letter characterizes player i’s choice, e.g. DC reads that player i, the high-
type player in ASYM, defected (D) and player j, the low-type player in ASYM,
cooperated (C). Columns 2 - 5 display how players responded to the move in the
previous period aggregated over the first 39 periods. Column 6 shows choices in
the last period separately because no move followed.
Table 2.3: Strategic interactions in HIGH (frequencies).
dyad followed by 40th period Sum
CC CD DC DD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CC 146 7 15 4 1 173
CD 8 3 14 11 0 36
DC 6 12 8 17 1 44
DD 9 12 5 74 7 107
Sum 169 34 42 106 9 360
Table 2.5 presents strategic reactions in ASYM while tables 2.4 and 2.3 deal with
LOW and HIGH respectively. For instance CC is followed by CC in ASYM with a
probability of 0.859 (67/7831), in LOW with a probability of 0.957 (224/234) and in
HIGH with a probability of 0.849 (146/172). Although the tables are informative,
they cannot be used as a basis for statistical tests as individual periods are not
independent observations. All following statistical tests will therefore be based on
dyad-level (independent) observations.
Pitman test.
30Note that choices in each treatment sum up to 360 observations only because the two moves of
both players in one period (CC, CD, DC, DD) are aggregated into one observation, e.g. we
have 40× 9 = 360 aggregated choices.
31Column 7 minus column 6, e.g. CC : 80− 2 = 78.
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Table 2.4: Strategic interactions in LOW (frequencies).
dyad followed by 40th period Sum
CC CD DC DD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CC 224 7 2 1 1 235
CD 1 6 1 14 1 23
DC 5 4 0 1 1 11
DD 2 2 7 74 6 91
Sum 232 19 10 90 9 360
Table 2.5: Strategic interactions in ASYM (frequencies).
dyad followed by 40th period Sum
CC CD DC DD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CC 67 9 2 0 2 80
CD 3 11 25 26 1 66
DC 7 16 13 17 0 53
DD 2 26 9 118 6 161
Sum 79 62 49 161 9 360
We first test whether asymmetry influences mutual cooperation.
RESULT 2: Symmetry has a positive effect on mutual cooperation.
SUPPORT: For this test, we compute the percentage of CC-choices in each dyad.
We then aggregate the dyads in HIGH and LOW and compare the resulting 18
independent observations on cooperation rates with the 9 independent observations
in ASYM. The Mann-Whitney U test (p ≤ 0.015; one-sided) yields a significant
difference in that the percentage of cooperation in SYM-dyads is significantly higher
than in ASYM-dyads.32 When comparing the 9 independent observations of the
symmetric treatment HIGH with those of LOW we find no significant difference
(p ≤ 0.245; one-sided).
RESULT 3: Asymmetry reduces the stability of mutual cooperation.
32The tests for HIGH vs. ASYM and LOW vs. ASYM are (p ≤ 0.056; one-sided) and (p ≤ 0.020;
one-sided) respectively.
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SUPPORT: Long sequences of mutual cooperation (i.e. more than 20 periods)
are extremely rare in ASYM (1 out of 9 dyads), whereas such long sequences are
found 4 times in HIGH and 7 times in LOW. A Fisher exact test shows that this
difference is significant (p ≤ 0.018; one-sided). There is, however, no significant
difference between the symmetric treatments (p ≤ 0.167; one-sided). Again, these
findings clearly indicate that symmetry matters for the stability of cooperation.
RESULT 4: Mutual cooperation is more frequently followed by mutual coopera-
tion in SYM than in ASYM.
SUPPORT: We compute for each dyad the relative frequencies of CC-moves fol-
lowed by CC-moves, i.e. the left most cells in table 3 - 5 for each group. A
Mann-Whitney U test comparing 18 dyads in SYM and 9 dyads in ASYM yields
(p ≤ 0.043; one-sided). Cooperation once reached is therefore higher in SYM than
in ASYM. The same test yields (p ≤ 0.370; two-sided) comparing HIGH and LOW,
(p ≤ 0.014; one-sided) comparing ASYM and LOW and (p ≤ 0.212; one-sided)
comparing ASYM and HIGH.33 Thus, the stability of cooperation once reached is
also higher in LOW than in ASYM whereas no significant difference can be found
between HIGH and LOW and between ASYM and LOW.
Based on Pruitt’s considerations on integrative solutions and the experimental
results by Schellenberg (1964), Sheposh and Gallo (1973) and Talley (1974), we
conjecture that the player type may have an impact on the pattern of cooperation
in ASYM. In particular, one might expect that low-type players are more likely to
shift from mutual cooperation to one-sided defection than high-type players, and
that high-type players are more likely to initiate cooperation after mutual defection
than low-type players. Even though there is no significant difference in behavior
with regard to the above conjectures, high-type players cooperate more frequently
than low-type players. We state these findings in the following observations.
Observation 1: Low-type players defect more frequently after mutual cooperation
than high-type players.
SUPPORT: We compare cooperation behavior of high-type and low-type players
after mutual cooperation. Aggregated over all 9 dyads, mutual cooperation is
maintained in 67 cases (see table 3.8). Mutual cooperation never directly leads
33A corresponding Fisher-Pitman permutation test yields (p ≤ 0.014; one-sided) for SYM vs.
ASYM (p ≤ 0.072; one-sided) for HIGH vs. ASYM, (p ≤ 0.011; one-sided) for LOW vs.
ASYM and (p ≤ 0.351; two-sided) for LOW vs. HIGH.
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to mutual defection in the succeeding period. One-sided defection after mutual
cooperation is observed 9 times for low-type players (CD) and only 2 times for
high-type players (DC). The overall cooperation rate of 38.75% in ASYM is due
to low-type players cooperating 36.9% whereas high-type players cooperate 40.6%.
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Analyzed on a dyad basis, 3 dyads exhibit no mutual cooperation and 1 dyad
shows no defections after mutual cooperation (see Appendix A.1). One-sided de-
fection of low-type players is observed in 3 dyads, while one-sided defection of
high-types is observed only once. In one dyad, both types of one-sided defection
can be observed once.
Observation 2: High-type players initiate cooperation more frequently after mu-
tual defection than low-type players.
SUPPORT: We compare cooperation behavior of high-type and low-type players
after mutual defection. Aggregated over all 9 dyads, high-type players choose
cooperatively after mutual defection in 28 cases while this happens only 11 times
with low-type players (see table 5).
Analyzed on a dyad basis, mutual defection is followed by cooperation of the
high-type player in 6 dyads and by cooperation of the low-type player in 2 dyads.
In one dyad, deviations from mutual defection never occurred (see Appendix A.1).
2.5.4 Analysis of Alternating Strategies
Instead of playing the subgame-perfect equilibrium of DD minimizing the payoff
difference35 or the cooperative solution of CC maximizing joint payoff36 in all 40
periods, players may pursue different goals in asymmetric games. Players may
try to even out the asymmetric payoff structure and aim for equal payoffs (c.f. de
Herdt (2003)).37 In our setting, equal payoffs are attainable by a rather complicated
alternation pattern: if the high-type player cooperates all the time, and the low-
type player defects in every fourth period both players get an average per-period
34Cooperation rates in LOW and HIGH are 70% and 59.17% respectively.
35(40× 6) + (40× 4) = 400, payoff difference 80.
36(40× 12) + (40× 8) = 800, payoff difference 160.
37See also the literature on inequity aversion, for instance Fehr & Schmidt (1999) or Bolton &
Ockenfels (2000).
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payoff of 9.38
We found only one dyad (number 7) that succeeded in establishing an alternation
sequence yet providing a Pareto inferior solution without achieving payoff equality
(see appendix A.1). The coordinated strategy of alternating between DC and CD
in each period, thus yielding an average per-period payoff of 6 to the low-type
player and of 9 to the high-type player was much simpler and the pattern lasted
for the final 20 periods.39
2.6 Conclusion
The basic hypothesis analyzed in this paper concerns the frequency of cooperative
play in asymmetric (ASYM) versus symmetric (HIGH and LOW) PD games. As
conjectured we find asymmetry to reduce cooperation rates by up to 41 percentage
points. LOW induces the highest cooperation rates followed by HIGH and finally
ASYM with significantly lower cooperation rates. Moreover, cooperation rates in
ASYM increase with a substantial delay compared to other treatments.
From the evidence gathered it seems that in symmetric games individual players’
ranking of outcomes is likely to be the same for both players. In asymmetric games,
however, this seems not to be the case because for the low-type player the CC-
outcome in all periods may not be as attractive thereby rendering coordination on
a mutually compatible outcome more difficult. In particular, player’s perception
of what constitutes a fair outcome is likely to diverge. In the asymmetric PD, low-
type and high-type players appear to have a different initial understanding of what
constitutes a mutually acceptable outcome (or series of outcomes, for example
in an alternation strategy) reducing cooperation rates. It appears that equality
arguments are important and depend on the relative position of the player. As
a low-type player, occasional defection may be a salient choice, “justified” by the
idea that this redresses the unmotivated asymmetry in payoffs. This is in line
with the finding by Roth & Malouf (1979) and Roth & Murnighan (1982) from
bargaining experiments. They found that bargaining strategies depend on the
38Playing CC for three periods gives 36 to the high-type player and 24 to the low-type player.
Playing CD in the fourth period adds another 12 to the low-type’s account.
39There exist a few failed attempts of other groups that could be interpreted as trying to establish
an alternation pattern.
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counterpart’s payoffs. In particular the low-type position is used to argue for
special advantages.40 High-type players may in contrast initially focus on mutual
cooperation as the salient choice rejecting responsibility for the assignment of types
that low-types try to redress. Such a self-serving bias resulting from the lack of a
mutually acceptable salient outcome reduces cooperation.41
Although cooperation rates in ASYM eventually increase, indicating some co-
ordination of strategies, they do not reach the levels found in symmetric games.
Essentially, asymmetry reduces the frequency of cooperation and the stability of
cooperation in dyads. Low-type players are more likely to defect after mutual
cooperation than high-types, and high-types initiate cooperation more often than
low-types. From this perspective, there seems to be at least a tendency to accom-
modate lower payoffs by low-types.
In our design asymmetry is imposed without being specifically motivated. This
may allow low-types to insist on occasional defection not being counted as such
(entailing no retaliation by high-types) because the assignment of the high- or
low-type position may be perceived as arbitrary. If asymmetry is motivated and
motivation is treated as an experimental design variable this line of argument could
further be tested. An experimental study designed along these lines may allow the
manipulation of fairness norms and is an important issue for further research.
40As found in Talley (1974), information about other player’s payoffs has a positive effect on
cooperation in symmetric games while decreasing cooperation of low-types in asymmetric
games.
41See Babcock et al. (1995) and Babcock & Loewenstein (1997) for a discussion of the negative
effects of self-serving biases in bargaining.
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3 Assignment versus Choice in
Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiments
Abstract: The chapter presents an experimental investigation comparing behavior
in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game when players can choose between two
different representations of the same PD, to behavior when players are assigned to
play a specific game. The main finding is that cooperation rates are up to 60%
higher in the games that were chosen. These findings are consistent with the robust
evidence of the psychology literature on non-strategic contexts that choice increases
motivation, trust, and performance. Given that in many contexts agents choose
the strategic situation they get involved in, assigning participants to experiments
may affect the external validity of some experimental findings.
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3.1 Introduction
The present study is concerned with the methodological question of the external
validity of experimental research based on the assignment of participants to exper-
imental games or decision situations. Experimental findings may systematically
misrepresent field outcomes if assigning participants to experiments has an im-
pact on the decisions made by the participants in the experiment and if such an
assignment does not occur in the field.
We experimentally analyze to what extent the very possibility of choosing the
game one is about to participate in, may have an important effect on behavior and
outcomes. To that end, we design an experiment based on a prisoner’s dilemma
(PD) game. We conduct five different treatments, divided into two categories:
the assignment treatments and the choice treatments. In the three assignment
treatments, participants play an externally imposed version of a PD game. The
three versions of the PD game are different representations of exactly the same
game. That is, they have the same number of players, the same action space, the
same information structure, the same payoffs, and the same Nash equilibrium. In
the two choice treatments, participants can choose the version of the PD game they
want to play from a binary set.
The experiment is related to the economic literature on freedom of choice. Ac-
cording to (Sen 1988, p. 290), “one reason why freedom [of choice] may be impor-
tant is that ‘choosing’ may itself be an important functioning ... if all alternatives
except the chosen one were to become unavailable, the chosen alternatives will
not, of course, change, but the extent of freedom would be diminished, and if the
freedom to choose is of intrinsic importance, then there would be a corresponding
reduction of the person’s advantage”.1 In our context, this is to say that, aside
from the particulars of a game, it matters whether the game is assigned, or if it is
chosen from a set of games. Whereas the literature on freedom of choice is con-
cerned with an effect on utility, we are interested in a potential behavioral impact
of choice.
Such a behavioral impact of choice has been studied in the psychology literature
in non-strategic contexts for several decades. The availability of choice is typically
1There is a literature that axiomatizes this line of thought (see Bossert et al. (1994), or Pattanaik
& Xu (2000)).
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understood as a form of decision control, i.e. the possibility to decide about a
forthcoming event that can involve choice among a set of alternatives or the reg-
ulation of an event’s timing and duration. Several empirical studies support the
notion that people who have choice experience “more intrinsic motivation, greater
interest, less pressure and tension, more creativity, more cognitive flexibility, bet-
ter conceptual learning, a more positive emotional tone, higher self-esteem, more
trust, greater persistence of behavior change, and a better physical and psycholog-
ical health” ((Deci & Ryan 1987, p. 1024)). In a classic experiment exposing two
groups to a recording of loud, unpredictable noises, Glass & Singer (1972) found
strong choice effects. Whereas participants in one group had no choice but to listen
to the recording, participants in the other group could choose to stop the tape at
any time by flipping a switch. These participants were told, however, that the ex-
perimenters would prefer that they not stop the tape, and most subjects honoured
this preference. Following exposure to the noise, participants with access to the
control switch made almost 60 percent fewer errors than participants helplessly
exposed to the noise on a proofreading task and made more than four times as
many attempts to solve a difficult puzzle.2
Related to our experiment are also some recent studies demonstrating the ef-
fect a random assignment of participants has on outcomes in experimental games
in contrast to situations where participants have the option to self-select. These
studies aim at separating participants by types and are based on the notion that
in many field situations that are scrutinized in the laboratory, people have the
possibility of avoiding the situation they are confronted with in the experiment.
Screening mechanisms used to select employees, customers and insurers are exam-
ples of situations where self-selection and/or sorting are essential features of the
strategic environment.
Charness (2000) for instance exogenously separated subjects on the basis of
performance in a dictator game prior to playing a bargaining game. Bohnet &
Ku¨bler (2005) attempt to sort out conditional cooperators and egoists by giving
2Similarly Elffers & Hessing (1997) found evidence that offering taxpayers a choice between full
itemized deduction and a comparable overall standard deduction enhances tax compliance. In
a classic experiment on learned helplessness Seligman (1974) found that loss of choice (control)
is experienced as aversive and has detrimental effects on people’s emotions, motivation and
cognition.
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the possibility to bid for participation in a PD game with higher out of equilibrium
payoffs than the status quo PD game in an auction. Lazear et al. (2006) design
an experimental dictator game with an outside option to separate between players.
Eriksson & Villeval (2004) (see also Ko¨nigstein & Villeval (2005)) experimentally
study a labor market where workers can choose the incentive scheme according to
which they are paid. They show that high skill workers separate from low skill
workers by choosing performance pay firms.3
Of some relevance to the present work, is also the literature on group member-
ship. In a classic experiment Tajfel (1970) allowed participants to identify with a
group based either on the preference for a painting by Kandinsky or Klee or the
tendency to over or underestimate the number of dots displayed on a screen prior
to allocating money between one in-group member and one out-group member.4
The effects of group membership and what is necessary to trigger such effects has
recently been systematically analyzed by Charness et al. (2006) in the context of
a battle of the sexes and PD game.
Finally, our paper relates to an emerging literature that criticizes the standard
methodology used in experimental economics in light of the possible lack of external
validity with respect to some experimental results obtained (see, notably, List &
Levitt (2005) and references therein, Lazear et al. (2006) and Harrison & Rutstro¨m
(2005)).
In contrast to the literature on self-selection/sorting and group membership, we
analyze to what extent experimental deviations from actual situations due to the
assignment of participants is based exclusively on the possibility of self-selection or
sorting, or whether choice has an important behavioral effect in itself. The present
paper extends the results obtained in the experimental psychology literature on
control and choice by analyzing whether choice effects are also found in strate-
gic environments, rendering them of particular interest to economic environments.
3Besides this literature, see for example the experimental studies by Niederle & Vesterlund
(2005) in the context of occupational gender differences, Cadsby et al. (2004), Eriksson et al.
(2005), and Dohmen & Falk (2006) in the context of worker-self-selection and productivity.
Although not directly concerned with sorting, Orbell & Dawes (1993) provided participants
in a one shot PD game the choice of not playing the game. Hauk (2003) provided an outside
option in a repeated PD game context. Cox et al. (2001) analyze endogenous entry and exit
in common value auctions.
4See also Tajfel et al. (1971), Yamagishi et al. (1999) and Yamagishi & Kiyonari (2000).
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Based on the idea that choice either via active modification of the strategic envi-
ronment5 or by passive self-selection into a particular strategic environment may
be an important property of many empirical problems studied using experimental
methods, we are interested in separating a choice effect from sorting or self-selection
effects.
We analyze the behavioral importance of the possibility of choosing the game to
be played in a scenario where the differences between the alternatives available are
kept to a minimum. We conjecture that a behavioral effect when players are given
the possibility of choosing between two games that in standard game theoretic
terms are equivalent, and differ only in the presentation of the game, may be
even more pronounced if differences between games are more substantial, and for
instance allow self-selection and sorting.
The experimental results clearly indicate that the mere fact that participants
can choose the game they want to play has a statistically significant impact on
behavior. Cooperation rates are higher when players can choose the game they
want to play as compared to when players are assigned to the game. The increase
in cooperation rates is in some cases even 60%. As an immediate consequence, the
current laboratory practice of assigning participants to experimental games may,
even absent the possibility of sorting, provide biased results. This finding adds an
additional reason why experimental results cannot directly be extrapolated to the
field.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. The next section intro-
duces the three versions of the PD that are used in this paper, Section 3 contains
the experimental procedure, Section 4 reports the experimental results and Section
5 concludes.
3.2 The Games
3.2.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Table 1 presents a typical 2-player matrix game in normal form. This game is a PD
if and only if, the following conditions are met: a > b > c > d and 2b > a+d > 2c.
5See the literature on self-governance, for instance Ostrom (1990) or Scott (1998).
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Table 3.1: General 2× 2 prisoner’s dilemma game in normal form (PD).
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate (b, b) (d, a)
Defect (a, d) (c, c)
Note: The first element of the payoff vectors refer to the row player. In the experiment
a = 400, b = 300, c = 100 and d = 0.
It is well known that both players playing defection is the unique Nash equi-
librium of the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game. Applying the logic of backward
induction, Luce & Raiffa (1957) showed that the unique Nash equilibrium outcome
in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game under perfect information is again
the one in which both players defect in every single period. In fact, the unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium is both players defecting in all periods regardless of
the prior history of play (see, e.g., Binmore (1992)).
The experimental analysis of the prisoner’s dilemma involves over thousand ex-
periments mainly in Psychology, Economics, Biology and Political Science. It has
been shown that behavior is sensitive to subtle changes in the experimental condi-
tions. Factors like repetition, experience, information, relative payoffs, monetary
incentives, fixed or random opponents and framing, play an important role in the
experimental behavior.6
In this paper we will analyze a prisoner’s dilemma game repeated over 20 periods
with a fixed opponent under perfect information. Earlier experimental studies
with assigned treatments show that average cooperation levels start relatively high,
between 40%-60%, and then gradually decline through time. We will see that our
experimental results conform to this general pattern.
3.2.2 The Decomposed Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Evans & Crumbaugh (1966a), Evans & Crumbaugh (1966b), and Pruitt (1967)
independently proposed the decomposed prisoner’s dilemma game. Consider the
game depicted in table 3.2. The game is played as follows: Both players face the
6Good overviews of the experimental literature are found in Lave (1965), Rapoport & Chammah
(1965), Roth & Murnighan (1978), Roth (1988), and Kagel & Roth (1995).
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same matrix. Each player must choose between actions Cooperate or Defect.7 Each
choice provides a payoff to the player in the self column, and a payoff to the other
player in the other column. Hence, if for example player 1 chooses C and player 2
chooses D, then player 1 gets w + z, while player 2 gets y + x.
The game in table 2 is a decomposed form of the PD game introduced earlier
(table 5.1) if and only if the following conditions hold: a = x + y, b = w + x,
c = y+ z and d = w+ z. Substituting these into the conditions that define the PD
game, the following conditions must be satisfied for the DPD game: y > w, x > z,
and w + x > y + z. These inequalities impose constraints on the PD, namely that
b+ c = a+ d. As a result only certain PDs are decomposable.8
Table 3.2: Schematic representation of a 2×2 PD game in decomposed form (DPD).
Self Other
Cooperate (w) (x)
Defect (y) (z)
Since the initial research by Evans & Crumbaugh (1966a), Evans & Crumbaugh
(1966b), Crumbaugh & Evans (1967), and Pruitt (1967) there have been a series of
studies, mainly conducted in the 1970ies, that analyzed different decompositions
of the PD game. In particular, the studies by Pruitt (1970), Pruitt (1981), Guyer
et al. (1973), Tognoli (1975), Pincus & Bixenstine (1977), Komorita (1987), and
Beckenkamp et al. (2006) analyzed the effects of different decompositions on coop-
eration rates in prisoner’s dilemma games.9 These studies largely revealed that the
type of decomposition has a significant impact on cooperation rates. While some
decompositions elicited less cooperation than the normal form game, others showed
a substantial increase in cooperative behavior. The generally accepted hypothe-
sis for this finding is that different decompositions arouse different motives in the
players. Based on the type of decomposition, decomposed games are either referred
to as take-some or give-some games, where take-some games evoke lower and give-
7In all the experimental games we used labels A and B, instead.
8Not all PDs are decomposable but a decomposable PD can be decomposed into an infinite num-
ber of DPDs. The conditions for decomposing a PD game are also referred to as seperability
conditions (Hamburger (1969)).
9Decomposed PD games are also discussed in Selten (1978) and Selten (1998).
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some games higher levels of cooperation than the normal form game. Typically, in
a give-some decomposition payoffs in the “self” column are lower than payoffs in
the “other” column, and vice versa for the take-some decomposition. According to
the psychological literature, give-some games evoke a higher level of cooperation
because they provide an opportunity to signal a willingness to cooperate at some
cost to self, and thus elicit trust and mutual cooperation. Take-some games in
contrast are supposed to heighten the competitive motivation of the players due to
their punishment aspect inflicted on the other player in case of defection.
Table 3.3: 2× 2 prisoner’s dilemma game in give-some decomposition
Self Other
Cooperate (0) (300)
Defect (100) (0)
Table 3.4: 2× 2 prisoner’s dilemma game in take-some decomposition
Self Other
Cooperate (150) (150)
Defect (250) (−150)
We evaluate the behavioral consequences of a choice of game in both settings.
The two decompositions of the standard prisoner’s dilemma game presented in
table 1 that will be analyzed experimentally are shown in tables 3 (give-some) and
4 (take-some). Note that both decompositions add up to the same parent game
presented in table 1.
3.3 Experimental Design
The experiments were conducted at the Experimental Economics Laboratory at
the University of Bonn using a program based on the z-Tree software developed by
Fischbacher (1999). At the beginning of each session participants were randomly
assigned to one of the 18 computer terminals. Before the session started, partici-
pants first had to read the instructions (see Appendix B.1), and then had to answer
test questions to check if they understood the game they were about to participate
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in. The experiment was started only once all participants had correctly answered
all test questions. We run two treatment conditions: choice (C) and assignment,
that is, no choice (∼ C). In the assignment condition participants were told the
game they were going to participate in, while in the choice condition participants
were informed about the two games they could subsequently choose from. In the
assignment condition we conducted three different treatments; one implementing
the prisoner’s dilemma in normal form of table 1 (∼ Cn), and the other two imple-
menting the decomposed prisoner’s dilemma games of tables 3 and 4 (∼ Cg and
∼ Ct). In the choice condition, two different treatments were conducted. In the
first treatment coded as Cng participants could choose between the normal form
and the give-some decomposition of the prisoner’s dilemma game. In the second
treatment coded as Cnt participants could choose between the normal form and
the take-some decomposition of the prisoner’s dilemma game.
All treatments where participants were assigned to play a specific game are
coded by ∼ C, that is, ∼ Cn for the normal form, ∼ Cg for the give-some de-
composition and ∼ Ct for the take-some decomposition of the prisoner’s dilemma.
The treatments where participants had the possibility to choose the game they
wanted to play are coded by C, where the following letters indicate the two choice
options i.e. treatment Cng allows participants to choose between the normal form
and the give-some game, and treatment Cnt allows participants to choose between
the normal form and the take-some game. Table 5 summarizes the experimental
treatments, and gives information on the number of groups, i.e. the number of
independent observations in each treatment.
In all treatments participants played against the same opponent for 20 periods.
In the choice treatments participants were randomly matched to play against a
player who chose the same game. In case choices did not allow matching all partic-
ipants according to choices made, two participants from each group were randomly
excluded. All this information was common knowledge.
A total of 126 students, mainly law or economics students, took part in the
experiment. The experiment took 45 minutes on average. Taler (the experimental
currency) were transformed into Euro at the exchange rate of 1000 Taler = ¤2.
Average payoffs were ¤9.92.
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Table 3.5: Experimental Treatments conducted and number of groups in each treat-
ment.
Treatment Game Groups
∼ Cn No choice, normal form 9
∼ Cg No choice, give-some decomposition 9
∼ Ct No choice, take-some decomposition 9
Cng Choice, normal form vs. give-some decomposition 17∗
Cnt Choice, normal form vs. take-some decomposition 18
* In the choice treatments players were grouped randomly after they had chosen the game
they wanted to play. In this case the amount of players who chose a particular game was
not even, so that one player from each group was randomly drawn to be excluded.
3.4 Results
We now analyze the central hypothesis of this paper. That is, if allowing partici-
pants to choose the game from a binary set of games with identical game theoretic
properties, as opposed to assigning them to the game, has a behavioral impact.
Table 3.6 gives information on the games chosen by players in the choice treat-
ments. Participants generally preferred the normal form as opposed to the decom-
posed prisoner’s dilemma.
Table 3.6: Number of groups choosing the PD and the DPD in the choice treat-
ments.
Treatment Groups choosing the PD Groups choosing the DPD
Cng 14 3(give-some)
Cnt 13 5(take-some)
Note that there is no clear mechanism to separate players by types of preferences.
For example, it has been shown in the literature (and replicated here) that the give-
some representation evokes more cooperative behavior. Then, cooperators may
choose the give-some decomposition over the normal form. Egoists, however, may
anticipate this behavior and go for the give-some decomposition too, and therefore
cooperators would think it twice before going for the give-some decomposition.
Hence, in contrast to the sorting literature mentioned above, it is not clear for
cooperators how to sort out from egoists, and for egoists how to match cooperators
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in this study. In fact, if sorting were present in our data, some games in the choice
treatments would exhibit higher cooperation rates and others should show lower
cooperation rates. We will immediately see, however, that this is not the case. As
a result our experiment allows the separation of a choice effect from other factors
such as sorting that have been found to influence experimental findings based on
a random assignment of participants.
An alternative explanation of the findings could in principle be due to in-group
effects as analyzed in the minimal group literature mentioned above. In line with
recent findings by Charness et al. (2006) who find that “purely minimal group
identification is insufficient” to find group membership effects in their PD and battle
of the sexes experiment, this explanation is unlikely to be capable of explaining the
significant treatment effects we observed.
We compare behavior exhibited in the assigned normal form game (treatment
∼ Cn) with the behavior of those players that chose the normal form game in the
choice treatments (Cng : n and Cnt : n). Analogously we contrast behavior in the
two versions of the assigned decomposed games (treatments ∼ Cg and ∼ Ct) to
the behavior of those players that chose the corresponding decomposed prisoner’s
dilemma game in the choice treatments (Cng : g and Cnt : t).
Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 plot the time series of the average cooperation rates
in treatments ∼ Cn and Cng : n, ∼ Cn and Cnt : n, ∼ Cg and Cng : g, and
finally ∼ Ct and Cnt : t. Table 7 reports the average cooperation rates.
Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4, and table 3.7 clearly show the strong behavioral effect
on relative cooperation levels of allowing players to choose the game they want to
play.
In the cases where the normal form game was chosen (treatments Cng : n and
Cnt : n), the increase in cooperation rates compared to the assigned prisoner’s
dilemma (treatment ∼ Cn) is dramatic. In both cases there is an increase of about
60% in the rate of cooperation. The permutation test (Siegel & Castellan (1988))
yields significance levels at .1% and .5% respectively.
Table 3.7: Average cooperation rates by treatment.
∼ Cn ∼ Cg ∼ Ct Cng : n Cng : g Cnt : n Cnt : t
0.33 0.80 0.66 0.83 0.82 0.88 0.91
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Figure 3.1: Time series of average cooperation rates in ∼ Cn and Cng : n.
Table 3.8: Gains from Cooperation.
Treatment Aggregate efficiency
∼ Cn 40.84
∼ Cg 80.00
∼ Ct 65.56
Cng : g 81.67
Cng : n 82.68
Cnt : t 91.00
Cnt : n 81.35
When analyzing the differences in behavior between the decomposed prisoner’s
dilemma in the assigned condition (treatments ∼ Cg and ∼ Ct) and the decom-
posed prisoner’s dilemma in the choice condition (treatments Cng : g and Cnt : t),
the effect is not as strong. Clearly, behavior in the decomposed games in the assign-
ment conditions (treatments ∼ Cg and ∼ Ct) is highly cooperative, rendering it
difficult to reach even higher cooperation levels in the choice treatments. Further-
more, the statistical tests suffer from the relatively small number of decomposed
games chosen by players (see table 6). Nevertheless, cooperation rates in the take-
some groups where participants freely choose the game (treatment Cnt : t) are
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Figure 3.2: Time series of average cooperation rates in ∼ Cn and Cnt : n.
close to 30% higher than in the assigned take-some game (treatment ∼ Ct). This
is a remarkable increase in the cooperation rate, (the permutation test yields a
0.1258 significance level, one sided). In the case of the give-some game (treatment
∼ Cg vs. treatment Cng : g) the increase is just 2.2%, clearly not significant.
Finally, we note that, as expected, framing significantly impacts behavior. Com-
paring the behavior between the three assigned treatments, it is clear that both
decompositions of the prisoner’s dilemma have a significant positive impact on co-
operation rates (with significance levels of .5% each). In the give-some treatment
∼ Cg participants achieve cooperation rates that result in roughly 80% of possible
profits being extracted - a 100% increase compared to the normal form treatment
∼ Cn.
3.5 Conclusion
There exist many economic and non-economic situations where agents make choices
that impact the incentive structure they face afterwards. In fact, choice is a fun-
damental economic reality. Based on this fact and motivated by the findings of
the psychological literature on choice in non-strategic settings and the literature
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Figure 3.3: Time series of average cooperation rates in ∼ Cg and Cng : g.
on freedom of choice, we conjectured that the very possibility of choosing the game
one wants to get involved in may have a significant impact on behavior even absent
any possibility of self-selecting, of sorting or of influencing the game.
In our experiment participants playing a PD game cooperate significantly more,
even 60% more on average, when they are given the possibility of choosing between
the PD game and a different representation of the same PD game, than when they
are directly assigned to play that game.
The set of games from which participants could choose contained two different
representations of a strategically identical game. Our data shows that despite this
narrow difference the change in behavior was dramatic. It can be hypothesized
that if the set of games to be chosen from not only consists of games differing with
respect to their representations, but also with respect to their strategic character,
resulting differences in behavior may even be more substantial.
Our findings indicate that motivational aspects inherent in the design and choice
of games, even absent the possibility of sorting, can have a significant impact on
outcomes. Although the choice effect identified in this paper is important, we can-
not directly separate it from a possible cognitive effect that may be due to the fact
that participants in the choice treatments were confronted with both presentations
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Figure 3.4: Time series of average cooperation rates in ∼ Ct and Cnt : t.
of the game allowing them, for instance, a more thorough understanding of the
properties of the game. In order to further explain the choice effect and separate
between a pure choice effect and a cognitive effect associated with the knowledge of
alternatives, additional experiments are required. Nevertheless, our results confirm
one of the basic tenets in psychology, namely that choice and loss of choice have a
substantial impact on human behavior. As shown by our results, choice not only
has an impact on outcomes in non-strategic environments but also in strategic situ-
ations. An immediate consequence for experimental research is to exert caution in
extrapolating results to the field. In contrast to the recent literature on sorting that
identifies the random selection of participants as a potential source of experimental
bias, at least in those situations where self-selection is an essential feature in the
field, we show that the assignment as such can have an impact irrespective of any
possible additional effects due to sorting.10 Until further experimental scrutiny,
it remains open whether this is (partially) due to cognitive effects of presenting
different options or whether this is due to choice as such.
10From that perspective it may not be sufficient to allow for sorting by assigning participants to
a game based on the performance in a prior one, although such a setting may allow a direct
comparison of the impact of sorting versus choice that is outside the scope of the present
study.
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4 The Role of Rivalry - Public
Goods versus Common-Pool
Resources
Abstract: Despite a large theoretical and empirical literature on public goods and
common-pool resources, a systematic comparison of these two types of social dilem-
mas is lacking. In fact, there is some confusion about these two types of dilemma
situations. As a result, they are often treated alike. In line with the theoretical
literature, it is argued that the degree of rivalry is the fundamental difference be-
tween the two games. Furthermore, an experimental study of the behavior in a
quadratic public good and a quadratic common-pool resource game with identical
Pareto optimum but divergent interior Nash equilibria is provided. The results
show that participants clearly perceive the differences in rivalry. Aggregate behav-
ior in both games starts relatively close to Pareto efficiency and converges quickly
to the respective Nash equilibrium.
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4.1 Introduction
Despite the seminal papers by Musgrave (1959), Musgrave (1969) and Samuelson
(1954) and a large theoretical and empirical literature on social dilemmas in gen-
eral, and public goods and common-pool resources in particular, it appears not to
be generally accepted in the experimental/behavioral literature that both types of
games are distinct. A typical example of a public good is national defense, while a
typical example of a common-pool resource is a fishery. Clearly, while it is not pos-
sible to restrict the enjoyment of the former, the fish caught by one individual is not
available to other users anymore.1 This distinction has led many authors to propose
a categorization of goods on the basis of excludability and rivalry.2 According to the
latter, a public good has two essential attributes: non-excludability and non-rivalry
in consumption. A common-pool resource, however, is non-excludable but rival.
The possibility of non-rival consumption by multiple consumers is the major fea-
ture distinguishing public goods from common-pool resources. Non-excludability,
that is, the difficulty of excluding non-paying consumers from consumption, is a
feature that both types of goods share.
Non-excludability, together with the fact that public goods and common-pool
resources can be reduced to a prisoner’s dilemma game3 (Ledyard (1995), Ostrom
1 There exist many empirical applications of the two concepts that demonstrate that the distinc-
tion is crucial for policy and institutional design (see, e.g., Ostrom (1990), Seabright (1993),
Ostrom et al. (1994) or Cornes & Sandler (1996)). Gaspart & Seki (2003) provide a good
example for the two types of games describing a fishery. Typically fisheries are common-pool
resources but the local fishery analyzed by them institutionally transforms this common-pool
resource into a public good by equally distributing the catch among villagers after each day
of fishing.
2 Samuelson (1954) introduced the polar definition of private versus public goods based on their
non-rivalry in consumption and Musgrave (1959), Musgrave (1969) suggested the criterion of
exclusion in addition to rivalry adding common-pool resources and club goods to the definition.
See also Samuelson (1955) and Musgrave (1983) as well as for example Taylor (1987), Cornes
& Sandler (1996), and Bowles (2003).
3Consider a game that belongs to the broad class of symmetric games with a symmetric Nash
equilibrium, Pareto dominated by a different symmetric action profile that is not an equilib-
rium. If one reduces such a game to a 2 × 2 game where the symmetric Nash equilibrium
is Pareto dominated by the alternative symmetric action profile, the latter not being a Nash
equilibrium, then it is obvious that one gets the structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game.
Clearly, symmetric common-pool resource games and public good games belong to the above
mentioned class of games. Note also that symmetric Cournot games, and Bertrand games also
belong to this class of games.
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(1990), Gintis (2000), Camerer (2003), Sandler & Arce (2003), have led many
authors to treat both social dilemma games as equivalent. Among these authors
are some that claim that both games are strategically equivalent (see e.g. Ledyard
(1995), (Gintis 2000, p.257) and (Camerer 2003, pp.45-46)). Based on this belief
the difference between public goods and common-pool resources has often been
reduced to frames or different representations of one and the same game. From
that perspective commons, resource or common-pool dilemmas are considered to be
take-some frames of public good games, whereas the term public good is reserved for
a give-some frame of the same game4 (see e.g. Brewer & Kramer (1986), Fleishman
(1988), Van Dijk & Wilke (1995), McCusker & Carnevale (1995), Sell & Son (1997),
Elliott & Hayward (1998), Van Dijk et al. (1999), and Van Dijk & Wilke (2000)). In
summary, there is a literature that claims that common-pool resources and public
goods are the same, and consequently uses the label “common-pool resource” for
a particular type of framed public good game.5
An explicit example of this is provided by (Gintis 2000, pp.257-258) who writes:
“While common pool resource and public goods games are equivalent
for Homo Oeconomicus, people treat them quite differently in practice.
This is because the status quo in the public goods game is the indi-
vidual keeping all the money in the private account, while the status
quo in the common pool resource game is that the resource is not being
used at all. This is a good example of a framing effect, since people
measure movements from the status quo and hence tend to undercon-
tribute in the public goods game and overcontribute (underexploit) in
the common pool resource game, compared to the social optimum.”
In this paper we first establish theoretically that public good and common-pool
resource games as used in the experimental literature are two distinct types of
social dilemmas. We show that the distinguishing feature of these two types of
4 A give-some frame presents the dilemma situation as one in which individually owned resources
have to be contributed to a common undertaking, whereas in a take-some frame the dilemma
consists in leaving resources in the common undertaking. For an experimental analysis of
give-some and take-some framing effects in a public good environment see Andreoni (1995a),
Sonnemans et al. (1998), Willinger & Ziegelmeyer (1999), or Park (2000).
5 Note that different labels may not be problematic as long as authors are aware of the difference
and explicitly state that identical labels are used for different games.
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games lies in the distributional factor that determines whether the good is rival or
non-rival. This difference gives rise to two distinct strategic environments. Based
on these theoretical differences we devise an experiment that tests whether the
theoretical differences have an impact on behavior in the two games. That is, our
aim is to assess whether the theoretical difference between the two types of goods
also has behavioral implications. For that purpose, we contrast a quadratic public
good game with interior Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., Chan et al. (1996), Sefton
& Steinberg (1996), Isaac & Walker (1998) and Laury et al. (1999), with a stan-
dard common-pool resource game (see, e.g., Ostrom et al. (1994), Keser & Gardner
(1999), Beckenkamp (2002), and Casari & Plott (2003)). We chose parameters in
which the differences between the two types of games are reduced to a minimum.
First, to guarantee that the structural differences between the two games cannot
be attributed to framing, both games are framed as give-some games. Second,
the Pareto solutions in both games are identical in terms of actions and payoffs,
third, the symmetric interior Nash predictions are located at symmetric points
from the extremes of the individual action space and involve the same payoffs. The
experimental results clearly show that starting from cooperative levels, aggregate
behavior in both games tends to the respective Nash equilibrium. This clearly in-
dicates that the differences in rivalry affect behavior, strengthening the importance
of differentiating between the two types of goods.
The paper is organized as follows. The first subsection of section 4.2 introduces
the typical public good and common-pool resource games found in the experimental
literature. The second subsection discusses the role of rivalry as the distinguishing
feature between public goods and common-pool resource games in a general setting.
Section 4.3 discusses the experimental design. In section 4.4 the experimental
findings are presented, and section 4.5 concludes with a discussion and summary.
4.2 Public Goods and Common-Pool Resource
Games
4.2.1 The Experimental Games
In this section we introduce two particular games that represent a public good
and a common-pool resource game. These games are taken from the experimental
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literature, and are the games that we will subsequently analyze experimentally. We
also introduce a first theoretical comparison of the two games, showing that the
distinguishing feature between both games is the degree of rivalry.
A Public Good Game
In the following we introduce a quadratic public good game with an interior sym-
metric Nash equilibrium. We concentrate on such a class of public good games
because common-pool resource games are typically characterized by an interior
Nash equilibrium. Since we are interested in the role of rivalry as the critical dif-
ference between the two types of games, we keep the differences between the two
games as minimal as possible.
The following formulation draws from Isaac and Walker (1998).6 There are n
identical players, N = {1, . . . , n}, each one with an endowment of e ∈ R++. Each
player i must decide how much to invest in the public good y, xi ∈ [0, e]. The level
of the public good is determined according to the technology
y = g(x) =
a∑
h∈N
xh − b
(∑
h∈N
xh
)2 1
n
, (4.1)
where x ∈ [0, e]n. All resources not invested in the public good are allocated to
a private account with a constant marginal return c. Hence, individual i’s payoff
function is given by
ui(x) =
a∑
h∈N
xh − b
(∑
h∈N
xh
)2 1
n
+ c(e− xi), (4.2)
Individual i’s best-reply function is
6 For other formulations of quadratic public good games with interior Nash equilibria see Sefton
& Steinberg (1996) (in their NE treatment), Chan et al. (1996) and Laury et al. (1999). Keser
(1996), Sefton & Steinberg (1996) (in their DE treatment), Willinger & Ziegelmeyer (1999),
Willinger & Ziegelmeyer (2001) and Falkinger et al. (2000) study public good games with
a unique interior dominant strategy equilibrium by making the private account quadratic.
Although this manipulation resulted in a quadratic payoff function, the underlying public
good remained linear. Quadratic public good games without interior Nash equilibrium have
been analyzed by Isaac & Walker (1991) and Isaac et al. (1985).
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xPGi (x−i) = argmax
{
0,
a− cn
2b
−
∑
h6=i
xh
}
, (4.3)
where x−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn). Solving (3) under symmetry, one gets
the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium
x∗PGi =
a− cn
2bn
∀i ∈ N. (4.4)
It is well known that applying the logic of backward induction to the finite
repetition of the public good game results in (4) being also the unique symmetric
subgame perfect equilibrium of the finitely repeated public good game.
The unique symmetric Pareto solution of the public good game is obtained by
optimizing
∑
h∈N uh(x) over
∑
h∈N xh:
xPG−Pi =
a− c
2bn
∀i ∈ N. (4.5)
A Common-Pool Resource Game
The following is a standard formulation of a common-pool resource game that
draws from Walker et al. (1990).7 Denote by i ∈ N = 1, . . . , n the i-th player in
the CPR game that is endowed with e ∈ R++, and has to decide how much of his
or her endowment to allocate to the common-pool resource xi ∈ [0, e]. Player i’s
payoff for the resources allocated to the common-pool are represented by
h(x)
xi∑
h∈N xh
=
[
a
∑
h∈N
xh − b(
∑
h∈N
xh)
2
]
xi∑
h∈N xh
. (4.6)
7 For other formulations of quadratic common-pool resource games see Clark (1980), Walker
& Gardner (1992), Ostrom et al. (1994), Herr et al. (1997), Beckenkamp & Ostmann (1999),
Keser & Gardner (1999), Walker et al. (2000), Beckenkamp (2002), Casari & Plott (2003),
Margreiter et al. (2005) and Apesteguia (2006). In the psychological literature common-pool
resource games are generally implemented as linear threshold CPRs alternatively known as
Nash demand games. See for example Suleiman & Rapoport (1988), Budescu et al. (1995),
Budescu & Au (2002). There also exist experimental CPR studies in non-strategic, decision-
theoretic environments (see e.g. Hey et al. (2004)).
60
4.2 Public Goods and Common-Pool Resource Games
As in the case of the public good game, all resources not invested in the common-
pool are allocated to a private account with a marginal return of c. Hence, player
i’s total payoff function is
vi(x) =
a∑
h∈N
xh − b
(∑
h∈N
xh
)2 xi∑
h∈N xh
+ c(e− xi). (4.7)
Individual i’s best reply function, the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, and
the unique symmetric Pareto solution in the common-pool resource game are re-
spectively
xCPi (x−i) = argmax
{
0,
1
2
[
a− c
b
−
∑
h6=i
xh
]}
, (4.8)
x∗CPi =
a− c
b(n+ 1)
∀i ∈ N, (4.9)
xCP−Pi =
a− c
2bn
∀i ∈ N, (4.10)
Note that the symmetric Pareto solution is the same in both games. Table 4.1
gives the theoretical predictions for the public good and common-pool resource
games for the parameters used in the experimental study.
Table 4.1: Experimental parameters and theoretical benchmarks.
Nash Equilibrium Pareto Solution
xi Individual Payoffs xi Individual Payoffs
Public Good 20 180 50 225
Common-pool Resource 80 180 50 225
The parameters used in the experimental study are: n = 4, a = 6, b = .0125, c = 1,
e = 100.
The values of the parameters were chosen so that (1) all predictions are in integer
numbers; (2) payoffs from playing the symmetric Nash equilibria are the same in
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both games, and, since the symmetric Pareto solution is the same for both games,
the gain in efficiency associated with a switch from Nash equilibrium to the Pareto
solution is also the same in both games (an increase in payoffs of 20%); and (3) the
symmetric Nash predictions in the public good and common-pool resource games
are located at symmetric points from the extremes of the individual strategy space.
Figure 4.1: Best-Response (BR) Functions.
Figure 4.1 draws the best reply functions in both games, together with the
Pareto reply function, common to both games. It displays the unique symmetric
Nash equilibrium in the CPR game, as well as the unique symmetric Nash equi-
librium in the PG game at the intersections of the respective best reply functions
with the symmetry line. In addition the figure shows the symmetric Pareto effi-
cient allocation for both games at the intersection of the symmetry line with the
individual Pareto reply function.
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Public Good versus Common-Pool Resource Games
The only difference between the two games is reflected in equations (1) and (6).
Equation (1), the individual payoff function from allocations to the public good,
reflects the non-rivalry property of public goods. The payoffs derived from the
public good on the part of a player do not reduce the payoffs derived from the
other players. In other words, for any x ∈ [0, e]n, all i ∈ N have exactly the same
payoff from the public good.
On the other hand, equation (6), the individual payoff function from allocations
to the common-pool, captures the rivalry property by introducing an individual
distributional factor xi∑
h∈N xh
.8 In this case xi∑
h∈N xh
represents a proportional dis-
tribution. The higher xi in relation to
∑
h∈N xh, the higher the appropriation of i
from the common-pool resource. Therefore, in the case of the common-pool, the
returns from the contributions of all players [a
∑
h∈N xh − b(
∑
h∈N xh)
2] are fully
distributed to the individual players on the basis of the individual distributional
factor xi∑
h∈N xh
. That is, the units from the common-pool consumed by player i are
not available anymore to any other player j 6= i.
4.2.2 The Role of Rivalry
Section 2.1 introduced two particular games, a quadratic public good game and a
common-pool resource game that we will subsequently study experimentally. The
preceding section also pointed to the differences between the two types of social
dilemmas. In the following we introduce general definitions of public good and
common-pool resource games. In these general definitions we do not impose any
restriction on symmetry, nor on the production functions from the public good,
the common-pool, and the private accounts. The only assumption we make con-
cerns the individual distributional factor from the common-pool. We will assume
a proportional distributional factor, although we do not restrict it to a symmetric
distributional factor. Of course, other distributional factors could be (and in fact
8The term distributional factor is used to distinguish it clearly from institutional arrangements
designed to manage a particular resource. From that perspective terms such as appropriation
rule or sharing rule, often found in the literature, may be a misleading term to describe
properties of the good.
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sometimes are) used.9 Then, by restricting the classes of possible public good and
the common-pool resource games we show that these two types of games cannot
be taken in general to be equal, and hence they are fundamentally different.
We introduce the following notation. The set N = {1, , n}, n ≥ 2, is the set of
players, indexed by i, Xi = [0, ei] is player i’s strategy space, ei ∈ R++, xi ∈ Xi,
X = X1 × . . .×Xn, and x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X.
Definition 1 (public good game): Denote by Γ1 = (N,X,U) the public good
game where the sets N and X are defined as above, and U = U1× . . .×Un, where
Ui : X → R is the payoff function of player i that is decomposed into functions
G : X → R (the public good production function) and Ci : Xi → R (the private
account payoff function), according to Ui(x) = G(x) + Ci(xi).
Definition 2 (common-pool resource game): Denote by Γ2 = (N,X, V ) the
common-pool resource game where the sets N and X are defined as above, and
V = V1×. . .×Vn, where Vi : X → R is player i’s payoff function that is decomposed
into functions H : X → R (the aggregated common-pool production function)
and Di : Xi → R (the private account payoff function), according to Vi(x) =
H(x) αixi∑
h∈N αhxh
+Di(xi),
∑
i αi = 1, and αi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N .
Proposition 1 : There is no configuration of functions G, Ci, H, and Di, such
that Γ1 ≡ Γ2.
Proof : To show that in general Γ1 ≡ Γ2 does not hold, we only need to find a
domain where such identity cannot hold. For simplicity, we do this by restricting
ourselves to the classes of CPR and PG games were the private accounts are linear,
the aggregated common-pool production function is strictly concave in
∑
h∈N xh,
and αi = αj for every i, j ∈ N . Now, assume, by way of contradiction, that there
exist G(x), Ci(xi), H(x), and Di(xi) such that Ui(x) ≡ Vi(x)∀i ∈ N , and for
all x ∈ X. Then, take any x ∈ X and i, j ∈ N , i 6= j with xi 6= xj. Hence,
Ui(x) ≡ Vi(x) and Uj(x) ≡ Vj(x) ∀x ∈ X imply that
G(x) = H(x)
xi∑
h∈N xh
+ [Di(xi)− Ci(xi)], (4.11)
9For a detailed discussion of different distributional factors and their consequences for the
type of game, see Beckenkamp (2006) and Rapoport & Amaldoss (1999). Gunnthorsdot-
tir & Rapoport (2006) conducted an experimental study of a proportional and an egalitarian
distributional factor in an inter-group competition game based on a linear public good.
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G(x) = H(x)
xj∑
h∈N xh
+ [Dj(xj)− Cj(xj)]. (4.12)
Setting (11) and (12) equal and solving for H(x), one gets
H(x)
(xi − xj)∑
h∈N xh
= [Dj(xj)−Di(xi)]− [Cj(xj)− Ci(xi)] (4.13)
Now, since Dh and Ch are assumed to be linear, let Dh(xh) = a + bxh and
Ch(xh) = c + dxh, where a, b, c, and d are real value parameters. Hence, (13)
implies that
H(x) = (d− b)
∑
h∈N
xh, (4.14)
which contradicts our initial assumption on the strict concavity of the aggregated
common-pool production function. ¤
The proof of Proposition 1 shows that public good and common-pool resource
games cannot be taken in general as identical social dilemma games by restricting
the production function of the CPR game to be concave, and the private accounts to
be linear. Clearly, such classes of public good and the common-pool resource games
are considerably broad since they encompass the class of experimental games stud-
ied in this paper, the standard and intensively studied linear public good games,
and the standard CPR experimental games.
4.3 Experimental Design
The experiments were conducted at the Experimental Economics Laboratory at the
University of Bonn using the z-Tree software developed by Fischbacher (1999). At
the beginning of each session participants were randomly assigned to one of the 16
computer terminals. Before the session started, participants first had to read the
instructions. In order to check if participants understood the instructions, three test
questions were given.10 The values used in the test questions were publicly drawn
10Both the instructions and the test questions are available at
http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/full/50/5/646/DC1.
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by randomly chosen participants from two urns and announced. The experiment
was started only once all participants had correctly answered all test questions.
We ran two sessions for each game, for a total of 8 independent observations
respectively. In each session 16 participants were randomly divided into groups of
4 to play a give-some frame of either the CPR or the PG game for 20 periods.11
Participants knew that they would remain in the same group for 20 periods but they
did not know with whom they were playing. At the end of each turn, participants
received information on their decision, aggregate decisions of all other players, the
payoffs from Account 1 (the common-pool or public good account) and 2 (the
private account), the sum of the payoffs from both accounts in that period, and
their total payoff so far. The parameterization of the PG game based on the payoff
function (2) was:
ui(x) =
6∑
h∈N
xh − 1
80
(∑
h∈N
xh
)2 1
4
+ (100− xi). (4.15)
The parameterization of the CPR game based on the payoff function (7) was:
vi(x) =
6∑
h∈N
xh − 1
80
(∑
h∈N
xh
)2 xi∑
h∈N xh
+ (100− xi). (4.16)
Communication was not allowed throughout the experiment.
4.4 Results
We begin by addressing the main question investigated in this paper12, namely,
whether the investment level in PG games significantly differs from the investment
level in CPR games. Table 4.2 reports summary statistics on average investments
for the entire experiment, as well as for the first and the second half. Also, the
11One urn contained all entries of the Y column of the total payoff table and the other contained
all values of theX row. Even though participants were equipped with calculators, the numbers
were chosen such that the test questions could be answered based on the entries in the tables
provided.
12Note that section 4.4 Results deviates from the published version.
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average payoffs, the standard deviations of the average allocations in the eight
groups, and the average of the standard deviations at the individual level, are
reported in the table.
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics.
PG CPR
Average allocation (periods 1 to 20) 21.4 74.8
Average allocation (periods 1 to 10) 23.3 72.2
Average allocation (periods 11 to 20) 19.5 77.4
Average payoffs (periods 1 to 20) 179.4 189.3
Standard deviation of average allocations 4.0 3.6
Average of standard deviation of individual behavior 21.7 20.4
Note: PG = public good; CPR = common-pool resource.
Result 1 : Aggregate investment in the PG game is statistically different from
investment in the CPR game.
Support to Result 1 : The permutation test on the basis of the average allocations
per group yields a significance of 0.01% (two-sided).13 Further, consider Figure 4.2
where the time series of average allocations per treatment are shown, and Figure
4.3 where the histogram of all individual decisions by treatment are reported.
Clearly, investment decisions in both games sharply differ. This indicates that
players are sensitive to the different incentive structures determined by the distri-
butional factor.
Having shown that investment decisions differ between games, it remains to be
shown whether the pattern of behavior exhibited by players also differs between
games. The distinction between investment levels (investment decisions) and the
pattern of behavior is important. Even though investment levels clearly differ,
behavioral strategies may still be the same.
Result 2 : The pattern of behavior in both games is qualitatively similar.
Support to Result 2 : Figure 4.2 shows that aggregate allocations in both, PG
and CPR games, start at levels in between the symmetric Pareto solution and the
respective Nash equilibria, and tend to converge to the respective Nash equilibria.
In fact, with respect to the tendency, average investment per group in the first half
13See Siegel & Castellan (1988) for a reference on the statistical tests used in this paper.
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Figure 4.2: Time Series of Average Allocations Per Treatment.
of the PG experiments are higher than those in the second half, while in the CPR
experiments the relation is the opposite. The Wilcoxon signed-ranks test yields
significance on the 0.0386 level for the PG case and on the 0.0039 level for the
CPR case (both one-sided). Furthermore, in both games, the null hypotheses of
no difference between average allocations in the second half of the experiment at
the group level with respect to the respective Nash equilibrium cannot be rejected
at a 5% significance level.
It is illuminating that average payoffs in the CPR experiment do not significantly
differ from those in the PG game. The permutation test does not reject at a 5%
significance level the null hypothesis of equal average payoffs between the PG and
CPR experiments.
However, this does not imply that behavior in CPR experiments is the mirror
image of behavior in PG experiments. In fact, when considering the distribution
of individual decisions between the PG experiments and the truncated distribution
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Figure 4.3: Histograms of Individual Investments in the Public Good (PG) and the
Common-Pool Resource (CPR) Experiments.
of the CPR experiments in Figure 4.3, differences appear to exist.14 Testing the
difference of averaged squared deviations from the respective Nash equilibrium
for all periods on the group level using a Fisher-Pitman permutation test does,
however, not yield a significant result (p ≤ 0.122; one-sided).
We conclude that participants in the experiments were sensitive to the unique
difference between the two games: the degree of rivalry as captured by the distribu-
tional factor. Hence, it appears not only that both types of games are theoretically
and conceptually different, but that these differences are also reflected in different
investment levels. Nevertheless, the pattern of behavior seems to be qualitatively
similar when the Pareto solution and the Nash equilibrium are taken as reference
points.
4.4.1 Individual Differences
So far the analysis was based on group level data. In this subsection we turn to
individual behavior. It has consistently been shown that behavior at the individual
14Note, however, that the Figure depicts a total of 320 dependent allocation decisions (8 groups
× 20 periods × two games) whereas the number of independent observations is 16, i.e. 8
groups per game.
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level is very heterogeneous in dilemma experiments. To check for this regularity
found in the literature, we compute for the respective game (equations (3) and (8))
the average of the squared differences between the observed data and the individual
best-reply functions over all periods at the individual level. Figure 4 reports the
distribution of the individual average squared differences.
Figure 4.4: Histograms of Individual Average Squared Differences between Ob-
served Data and Best-Reply Predictions in the Public Good (PG) and
the Common-Pool Resource (CPR) Experiments
The range in Figure 4.4 goes from 0 to a maximum of 2500,15 with 25 intervals of
length 100. Note that the distributions in Figure 4 are quite dispersed. The mean
deviation in the CPR (PG) experiments is 635.3 (839.5) with standard deviation
455.4 (462.1).
Classifying individuals as best-repliers if they deviate 15% or less from the best
reply in action space, about 20% of participants in the CPR experiments, and
about 10% of participants in the PG experiments fall in that category. However,
if we were to take players as exhibiting behavior substantially deviating from the
15Note that if we take the individual decision and the best-reply prediction as uniform random
variables, the difference in expectation of the order statistics is 100/3, implying a squared
difference of about 1,110.
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best-reply when they deviate by 30% or more in action space16 from the best-reply
prediction, about 18% of the players in the CPR experiments, and about 25% in
the PG experiments are characterized that way. Consequently, it appears that,
consistent with previous findings, individual behavior in our experiments is quite
diverse.
4.4.2 Sequential Dependencies
Our experimental games were conducted in partner design, that is, the same group
of individuals interacted throughout the entire experiment. By doing so we adhered
to the early experimental practice in both PG and CPR experiments, allowing us
to gain a relatively high number of independent observations for the statistical
analysis. A natural alternative to our design choice is to use random matching.
Random matching has very important advantages since it minimizes reputation
effects and other sequential dependencies. As a result, it is interesting to analyze
to what extent sequential dependencies were present in our data. Of course, the
ultimate test for such a question encompasses the comparison of experiments with
and without random matching. Such a comparison is out of the scope of the present
paper, but we can, nevertheless, make some tests in this respect.17
Individuals received feedback on the behavior of the opponents, in form of ag-
gregate contributions in the group, throughout the experiment. In Figure 4.1 we
showed that according to best-reply a negative relation between others’ allocations
and one’s allocation should hold. On the other hand, a positive relation could
indicate some kind of sequential dependency; for example a taste for conformity
with the behavior of others.
We measure such (first-order) dependencies by computing the Spearman rank-
order correlation coefficient for each individual between the individual allocation
decisions and the last observed sum of allocations of the opponents. Of the 32
individual coefficients in the PG (CPR) experiments 12 (19) were negative. A bi-
nomial test yields no difference at standard significance levels between the number
of positive and negative coefficients in both experiments. That there is not a pre-
dominantly negative relation is not surprising given the remarkable deviations from
16See the previous footnote.
17Botelho et al. (2005) study these sort of questions in the context of public good games.
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best-reply that we could observe at the individual level in Figure 3. Further, the
no significance result suggests that (first-order) sequential dependencies between
individuals seem not to be significantly present in our data.
4.4.3 Related Literature
Our experimental findings in the quadratic PG and the quadratic CPR game are
generally in line with previous experimental evidence.
The literature on quadratic public good games reports similar investment pat-
terns to those observed here: behavior starts around the Pareto solution and then
declines towards the Nash equilibrium with repetition. Interestingly, both (1) ex-
perimental studies of quadratic public good games where the interior Nash equi-
librium is in dominant strategies (see Keser (1996), Falkinger et al. (2000), and
Willinger & Ziegelmeyer (1999) and (2) those without an interior Nash equilibrium
in dominant strategies (see Isaac & Walker (1998) and Laury et al. (1999)18, show
the mentioned pattern from Pareto to Nash, but at lower rates than those found
here. That is, the convergence to Nash that we observe is quicker than the conver-
gence reported in the literature. The determinants of such a difference are difficult
to identify since there are many design differences between our experiments and
those mentioned above.19 However, this is an interesting observation that should
be investigated in future research.20
For the CPR game, there is conflicting evidence on the tendency of aggregate
decisions through time. This seems to depend on a variety of issues such as the
endowment, the group size, etc. Nevertheless, the general pattern of an increase
18See Anderson et al. (1998) for a theoretical discussion of these results. Laury & Holt (n.d.)
provide an overview of the PG literature with interior Nash equilibrium. For recent experi-
mental studies of linear public good games see for example Maier-Rigaud et al. (2005), Brandts
& Schram (2001), Keser & van Winden (2000), Ga¨chter & Fehr (1999), Palfrey & Prisbrey
(1997), Andreoni (1995b), and Laury et al. (1995).
19Charness et al. (2004) have shown that payoff tables reduce cooperativeness in the context of
gift exchange experiments. Gu¨rerk & Selten (2006) find the opposite effect in the context of
oligopoly experiments. In Laury et al. (1999) conversion was quicker in the treatments with
more detailed information containing payoff tables than in the treatments without. In our
experiment conversion is even quicker than in their detailed information treatment.
20 For an experimental study on the rates of convergence to equilibrium in 3 × 3 games see
Ehrblatt et al. (2005).
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of investment towards the Nash equilibrium has also been observed in the low
endowment treatment in Walker et al. (1990), Ostrom & Walker (1991), Ostrom
et al. (1994) and Apesteguia (2006). Whereas, Keser & Gardner (1999), Gardner
et al. (1997), Walker et al. (1990) in the high endowment treatment, and Casari &
Plott (2003), find investments above the Nash equilibrium.
Inspired by the theoretical results of Rapoport & Amaldoss (1999), Gunnthors-
dottir & Rapoport (2006) study the two distributional factors analyzed here in the
context of an inter-group competition game. The game within the group was a
linear public good game with corner solution that determined the probability of
winning a fixed award that afterwards was either split according to a proportional
or an egalitarian distributional factor. The proportional distributional factor cor-
responds here to the CPR experiment, while the egalitarian distributional factor
corresponds to the PG experiment. Although there are many differences in the de-
sign of their experiment and ours, their findings for the proportional distributional
factor are similar to the pattern observed in the present CPR game. The main dif-
ference concerns the egalitarian distributional factor, where Gunnthorsdottir and
Rapoport found significantly higher contributions that only slowly converged to
the Nash equilibrium in their experiment.
4.5 Conclusion
The aim of this study was to shed some light on the commonalities and differences
between common-pool resources and public goods. We designed a public good and
a CPR game with identical quadratic production function in order to compare both
games on a theoretical and experimental level.
We show that, in contradiction to the common belief that CPR and PG games
are theoretically identical, the two games are in fact distinct games. We show
that this difference is based on rivalry as captured by a proportional distributional
factor.
The experimental results clearly support the theoretical result that both games
are different. Investment decisions in the public good experiments are statistically
different to those in the common-pool resource ones. Given that both games were
framed as give-some games, this difference can not be attributed to framing. Hence,
the results clearly indicate that participants were sensitive to the rivalry structure
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of the strategic situation. Despite this difference reflecting the structure of the
two games, there appear to be some behavioral similarities. In the CPR game
the aggregate Nash equilibrium investment level is above the Pareto efficient one,
whereas in the PG game the aggregate Nash equilibrium is below the Pareto efficient
level. In both games, aggregate investment approaches the Nash equilibrium over
time. At the beginning the Pareto optimum and later the Nash equilibrium appear
to be behaviorally relevant. Aggregate behavior in both games is surprisingly
similar in the sense that it starts in the neighborhood of the Pareto optimum and
moves rather quickly to the respective aggregate Nash equilibrium.
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5 Purchase Decisions with
Non-linear Pricing Options under
Risk
Abstract: Purchase decisions with linear and non-linear pricing under risk are
the focus of this chapters experimental analysis. The experiment is based on a
single period stochastic inventory problem with endogenous cost. It extends classic
binary lottery experiments to test standard decision theoretic predictions concern-
ing purchasing behavior in a rebate and a discount scheme. In particular, it is
investigated to what extent customers continue to purchase under two mathemat-
ically isomorph formats of non-linear schemes even if switching to a linear pricing
scheme is optimal. The results indicate that rebate and discount schemes exert a
significant attraction on customers. Given the increased role of non-linear pricing
schemes, systematic deviations from optimal behavior are an important element
in the design of such schemes and may raise consumer protection and competition
questions of substantial policy relevance. The chapter conlcudes with a discussion
on how the results can be explained by decision heuristics.
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5.1 Introduction
Standard economic theory suggests that customers should be indifferent to the
format of a price reduction. In particular this implies that one would expect a
customer to switch independently of the scheme in use from one pricing scheme to
another (one supplier to another) as long as there is at least an expected reduction
in the effective purchase price. The recent surge in the use of rebates, discounts,
bonus and point schemes implemented by retailers but also observed in other levels
of the production chain begs the question of whether traditional economic expla-
nations do fully account for the increased usage of non-linear pricing methods.
An understanding of potential behavioral reasons for using such pricing schemes
may not only be relevant for their design, but also for consumer protection and
competition policy issues.1
This paper focuses on the analysis of behavioral responses triggered by rebate
and discount schemes in a decision theoretic context similar to the classic lottery
experiments conducted by Kahnemann and Tversky. In our analysis we consider
two mathematically identical formats of such schemes. In the “discount” format a
reduced price is granted from the start and the discount has to be reimbursed at
the end of a reference period if a quantity threshold has not been reached. In the
“rebate” format a reduced price is granted retroactively once a quantity threshold
has been reached. The effects of these two formats are experimentally tested by
confronting participants with different price schemes in a formally identical risky
decision-making environment.2 The discount and rebate schemes are contrasted to
a conventional linear price scheme.
Of relevance to this paper is the extensive literature in operations research on
what is called the newsvendor problem, i.e. the problem of determining the ex-
pected profit maximizing stocking decision under stochastic demand of a product
1In competition policy for instance, one of the most controversial aspects of the recent review of
the European Commissions approach to abuse of dominance under Article 82 ECT concerns
potential foreclosure effects in rebate schemes. See Beckenkamp & Maier-Rigaud (2006) for an
experimental discussion of rebate schemes in the context of Article 82 ECT. A more general
discussion of the antitrust issues surrounding rebate schemes can be found in Maier-Rigaud
(2006).
2Although rebate and discount schemes need not be formally identical (such as for example
under discounting) our experiment is designed so that both schemes are isomorph.
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that becomes obsolete at the end of a single period.3 The optimal solution is char-
acterized by a balance between expected cost of understocking and the expected
cost of overstocking. The newsvendor problem has also recently been analyzed ex-
perimentally.4 The main result of the experimental literature is that procurement
quantities for low profit products were higher than expected profit maximizing
quantities while orders for high profit products were lower than expected profit
maximizing quantities.
Also related to our study is the paper by Eckel & Grossman (2003) analyzing
different formats for charitable contributions. They report much higher charity re-
ceipts under a matching condition, where the experimenter matched any individual
contribution at a preannounced rate than under a mathematically equivalent re-
bate condition where a portion of the contribution was paid back. Davis & Millner
(2005) similarly focus on the effects of changes in the format of identical prices
by offering chocolate bars under a rebate and a matching condition. They find
that participants purchase significantly more chocolate bars under the matching
condition, confirming the result by Eckel & Grossman (2003).5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses rebate, discount and lin-
ear pricing schemes in a simple vertical (upstream producer, downstream retailer)
relationship. Two hypotheses for the experimental results are considered: The
risk neutral maximization of expected profits and boundedly rational behavior as
described for instance by prospect theory. Section 5.3 describes the experimental
design, the hypotheses and the experimental results and section 5.4 concludes.
3The newsvendor problem is the fundamental building block of stochastic inventory theory. See
for instance Arrow et al. (1951) or Mills (1959). Overviews can be found in Porteus (1990)
and Petruzzi & Dada (1999).
4See Schweitzer & Cachon (2000), Brown & Tang (2000), Bolton & Katok (2005), Lurie &
Swaminathan (2005), Ben-Zion et al. (2005), and Katok et al. (2006).
5See also Davis (2006), Eckel & Grossman (2006), and Davis et al. (2005). Karlan & List (2006)
show that the offer to match contributions to a non-profit organization increases the likelihood
and amount an individual donates in a field experiment.
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5.2 Theoretical Background
5.2.1 Rebate, discount and linear pricing schemes
Consider two upstream firms that produce a homogenous product at marginal cost
c. The product is bought by a downstream retailer, that sells the good to final
consumers.6 The upstream firms are referred to as A and B. Denote by Ti(qi) the
downstream firm’s payment to upstream firm i depending on the amount of units
qi bought.
The upstream firm A offers a rebate scheme, that is, TA(qA) ≡ wqA if qA < q¯ and
(1 − α)wqA otherwise, where w > 0, α ∈ (0, 1) and qA ≡
τ∑
t=1
qAt, where τ denotes
the final subperiod of the reference period. In this scheme, the downstream firm’s
average per unit price and marginal price equals w at the end of τ if qA < q¯ units are
purchased and (1 − α)w otherwise. Since α > 0 the downstream firm is rewarded
for purchasing at least q¯ units. This implies that firm A uses a rebate scheme where
α is the percentage discount off the list price w once q¯ units have been bought.7
The upstream firm B in contrast offers a conventional price scheme, i.e. a linear
pricing schedule implying a cost of TB(qB) ≡ vqB ∀qB ≥ 0 for the downstream firm,
where qB ≡
τ∑
t=1
qBt.
Consider the following variation to firm A′s pricing strategy that we refer to
as discount scheme. An upstream firm C may offer a discount price schedule
TC(qC) ≡ (1−α)wqC+F (qC) if qC < q¯ and (1−α)wqC otherwise, where qC ≡
τ∑
t=1
qCt.
This scheme is mathematically equivalent to the rebate scheme if F (qC) = αwqC ∀
qC . The only difference is that the reduced price (1− α)wqC is paid from the first
unit on and F (qC) is only paid if qC < q¯ at the end of τ .
8
The downstream firm buying the good incurs only the cost of its purchases from
6Although it is rather standard to treat firms as individual decision makers and we will also
do so in the theoretical as well as experimental part of the paper, it is still noteworthy that
typically, a corporate decision making process underlies the behavior of the firm.
7Note that from a modelling perspective the pricing behavior of the upstream firms is the result
of a profit maximizing calculus based on behavior downstream (retailer and final consumers).
We neither model this vertical relationship nor competition upstream explicitly because it
unnecessarily complicates the exposition without adding any particular insight to the question
at hand.
8Note that due to this isomorphism we will be able to concentrate on rebate schemes in the
following theoretical exposition. All results directly apply to discount schemes as well.
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the upstream firm(s) when it purchases qi > 0 units of the good. Let p denote
the retail price and qt(p,X) the consumers demand function with qt(p,X) ≥ 0 ∀
p,X, where X ∼ N(µ, σ) is a censored normally distributed (i.e. an approximately
normally distributed) random variable cut at zero with a mean of µ and a standard
deviation of σ.9
The upstream firms profits are given by piui ≡ Ti(qi) − cqi and the downstream
firm profit is given by pid ≡
τ∑
t=1
pidt , where pi
d
t is given by:
pidt ≡

qt(p, x)p−
∑
i∈{A,B}
Ti(qi) if st +
∑
i∈{A,B}
qi ≥ qt(p, x)
p(st +
∑
i∈{A,B}
qi)−
∑
i∈{A,B}
Ti(qi) otherwise.
(5.1)
The level of stock at time t is denoted by st.
10 Let E(p∗) denote the expected
profit maximizing price and E(q) ≡ E(qt(p∗, X)) the corresponding expected profit
maximizing quantity.
Based on the price scheme information of the upstream firms and the demand
function, the downstream firm calculates its expected profit maximizing price.
Given that price, it can determine the corresponding expected quantity that fi-
nal consumers will buy and order accordingly. We consider the case where pricing
of the downstream retailer exerts some inertia, that is, for example, due to menu
cost, prices are fixed at the beginning of the reference period for the whole period.11
Ordering decisions can, however, be taken at least twice during the reference period.
We consider the reference period to be divided into τ subperiods, with subperiod
t ∈ {1, ..., τ}. The demand in each subperiod qt(p∗, X) is a random variable from
one and the same random process and we assume that the demand in each sub-
period is independent from each other. This implies that we consider the special
case where the cumulated expected sales in each subperiod increase linearly and
proportionally in time.12
9The corresponding probability density function is given by f(x). Note that demand in each
subperiod is therefore not only dependent on price but also on the normally distributed random
term X whose realization is denoted by x.
10s0 ≡ 0 and st+1 ≡
∑
i∈{A,B}
qit + st − qt(p, x).
11Assuming fixed retail prices simplifies the decision problem of the retailer as pricing is eliminated
from his strategy set.
12For a competition policy discussion of time in the context of rebate schemes see Maier-Rigaud
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5.2.2 Risk neutral maximization of expected profits
We are now interested in the question under what conditions it is profit maximizing
for the downstream firm to switch from supplier A or C to supplier B. In order to
simplify we consider the situation in the τ ’th subperiod with v = (1− α)w, where
the retailer has already bought
τ−1∑
t=1
qot units, sold
τ−1∑
t=1
qt units and therefore holds a
stock of sτ =
τ−1∑
t=1
(qot − qt) units.13 In that case, qˆτ ≡ q¯ −
τ−1∑
t=1
qt units would need to
be bought to reach a purchase quantity equal to the threshold.
In order to determine under what constellation it is optimal to leave the rebate
scheme, we need to calculate the optimal quantity a profit maximizing risk neutral
retailer would want to have available. If the retailer chooses to remain in the
rebate scheme, the optimal quantity q∗R > 0 the firm should keep available for
serving demand is
q∗R ≡ arg max
qR≥qˆτ

p∗
(
qR∫
−∞
xf(x)dx+ qR
∞∫
qR
f(x)dx+
τ−1∑
t=1
qt
)
−(1− α)w
(
qR +
τ−1∑
t=1
qt
)

or
q∗R ≡ arg max
qR<qˆτ

p∗
(
qR∫
−∞
xf(x)dx+ qR
∞∫
qR
f(x)dx+
τ−1∑
t=1
qt
)
−w
(
qR +
τ−1∑
t=1
qt
)
 ,
depending on whether
max
qR≥qˆτ
p∗
 qR∫
−∞
xf(x)dx+ qR
∞∫
qR
f(x)dx+
τ−1∑
t=1
qt
− (1− α)w(qR + τ−1∑
t=1
qt
)
(2005).
13Due to the recursive nature of the problem over time solving for the expected profit maximizing
stock at τ requires dynamic programming. We assume here that qot has been chosen in an
optimal fashion for all t ∈ {1, ..., τ − 1}. Given the stochastic nature of the process, any
arbitrary
τ−1∑
t=1
qot could be the outcome of an optimal process, albeit with different probabilities.
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T max
qR<qˆτ
p∗
 qR∫
−∞
xf(x)dx+ qR
∞∫
qR
f(x)dx+
τ−1∑
t=1
qt
− w(qR + τ−1∑
t=1
qt
) .
Note that the latter case (equation 5.2) only arises if past sales were substantially
lower than expected, that is, qˆτ is large (
τ−1∑
t=1
qt is small) compared to the underlying
distribution of potential expected sales.14
If the retailer decides to switch, the optimal quantity the firm should keep avail-
able for serving demand is
q∗S ≡ argmax
qS

p∗
(
qS∫
−∞
xf(x)dx+ qS
∞∫
qS
f(x)dx+
τ−1∑
t=1
qt
)
−w
(
τ−1∑
t=1
qt + sτ
)
− v(qS − sτ )
 .
Based on the optimal quantity15 (composed of the remaining stock plus newly
bought quantities, i.e. q∗R = sτ + q
o
τ ), expected profits given the retailer remains in
the scheme16 is given by
E(pi|R) ≡

p∗
(
q∗R∫
−∞
xf(x)dx+ q∗R
∞∫
q∗R
f(x)dx+
τ−1∑
t=1
qt
)
−(1− α)w
(
q∗R +
τ−1∑
t=1
qt
)
if q∗R ≥ qˆτ ,
p∗
(
q∗R∫
−∞
xf(x)dx+ q∗R
∞∫
q∗R
f(x)dx+
τ−1∑
t=1
qt
)
−w
(
q∗R +
τ−1∑
t=1
qt
)
otherwise,
(5.2)
where, given that v = (1−α)w, it is trivial that the retailer would prefer to switch
if q∗R < qˆτ and therefore E(pi|R) is strictly dominated by E(pi|S) in the latter
14Note that expected sales are potential as sales can only be made if sufficient quantity is held
available.
15The analysis suggests that optimal orders and stocks are dependent on the variance of the
distribution of expected sales, not only expected sales as such.
16We explicitly exclude the possibility of buying from both, firm A and B in τ . In fact eliminating
this option is only relevant if v < (1 − α)w, as the retailer would then strictly prefer firm B
for quantities above the threshold (if the remain option is optimal). As v = (1 − α)w, the
retailer is indifferent between A and B for quantities above the threshold.
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expression, and it is trivial that the retailer would prefer to remain if q∗R > qˆτ and
therefore E(pi|S) is strictly dominated by E(pi|R).
Expected profits given the retailer decides to switch to the linear pricing scheme
offered by firm B while planning the corresponding optimal quantity of q∗S = sτ+q
o
τ
is
E(pi|S) ≡ p∗
 q
∗
S∫
−∞
xf(x)dx+ q∗S
∞∫
q∗S
f(x)dx+
τ−1∑
t=1
qt

−w
(
τ−1∑
t=1
qt + sτ
)
− v(q∗S − sτ ), (5.3)
If E(pi|R) = E(pi|S), the downstream firm is indifferent between S (switching
supplier, i.e. choosing firm B) and R (remaining with the current firm, i.e. firm
A).
Solving for qoτ , we obtain the relevant switching threshold where the retailer is
indifferent between schemes. The relevant numerical values based on the param-
eters used in the experiment will be presented in a later section together with a
more detailed explanation.
5.2.3 Boundedly rational behavior
A classical example of “framing effects”17 is the change from risk-averse to risk-
seeking behavior depending on whether the consequences of a decision problem
(such as vaccination) are presented as a gain (200 of 600 threatened people will be
saved) or as a loss (400 of 600 threatened people will die).18
Framing effects, however, are not simply the result of mistakes, i.e. unsystem-
atic deviations around some true values, but are the result of systematic biases.
17See Tversky & Kahnemann (1981). Selten & Berg (1970) referred to such effects as presentation
effects.
18Another framing effect concerns the order of play. Rapoport (1997), for example, has shown
that sequential quantity decisions in a duopoly context push market shares towards the Stack-
elberg result even if these quantity decisions are not announced to the competitor and the
game therefore remains isomorph to its simultaneous play version.
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Boundedly rational decision makers19 under- or overestimate certain decision op-
tions systematically (and predictably).
In the original formulation of prospect theory developed by Kahnemann & Tver-
sky (1979), the term prospect referred to a lottery. Prospect theory suggests an
explanation for framing effects, for example changes from risk-seeking to risk-averse
behavior and vice versa, by assuming that the evaluations around losses and gains
are based on a reference point.
According to prospect theory, the mapping of payoffs into utilities is not linear,
but the value of gains or losses follows a nonlinear, “S”-shaped function (See Figure
5.1). The consequence is that decision makers who evaluate a decision framed as a
loss will tend to take decisions that are risk-seeking.
Figure 5.1: Mapping of payoffs according to prospect theory.
-0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.4
ΠHqA,qBL
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0.5
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uHΠL
Note: The function u(pi) gives the subjective payoffs and is given by u(pi) ≡ piα, ∀ pi ≥ 0
(win frame) and by u(pi) ≡ −γ(−piβ), ∀ pi < 0 (loss frame). The values of the parameters
used in Figure 5.1 were α ≡ 0.4 β ≡ 0.4 and γ ≡ 2.25.
Prospect theory has been widely used in behavioral economics in order to ex-
plain a diverse range of situations that appear inconsistent with standard economic
19The concept of bounded rationality was originally introduced by Simon (1955) with a view to
the cognitive limitations of the human mind. At least since Selten (1978), the concept has
broadened to encompass not only limitations of knowledge and computational capacity but
genuinely different aspects such as motivation, adaptation and emotion.
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theory, such as the equity premium puzzle, the status quo bias, various gambling
and betting puzzles, inter-temporal consumption and the endowment effect. It can
also be used to derive predictions concerning switching behavior.
In the domain of marketing, Folkes & Wheat (1995) observed changes in the
perception of prices in dependence of pricing schemes. Mowen & Mowen (1991)
developed a model of time and outcome valuation (TOV) that incorporates both
theoretic considerations and empirical results from prospect theory and approach-
avoidance-conflict theory (Miller (1959)).20 By integrating the latter, the impact
of time on the valuation process in win- and loss-frames can be explained. TOV
assumes that the “S”-shaped function of prospect theory flattens over time with
different gradients in the win- and in the loss-frame. Therefore, according to TOV
both losses and gains in the future are “discounted” compared to immediate gains
and losses, with different discount rates respectively. TOV can be used to derive
predictions concerning differences between rebates and discounts.
5.3 The Experiment
5.3.1 Design
The experiment was conducted at the experimental laboratory of the University
of Bonn (BonnEconLab) using a computer program based on z-Tree (Fischbacher
(1999)). A total of 118 students (N = 118 independent observations) participated
in the experiment. In all treatments participants were in the position of a retailer
having to choose from what firm (A or B; C or B) to procure and what quantity
to procure for the fourth quarter, i.e. τ = 4. The fact that the quantity of the
first three quarters had already been bought either from firm A (offering a rebate
scheme) or firm C (offering a discount scheme) was imposed.21
A table containing the highest possible sales quantities for the last 10 years
20See also the empirical analysis by Juliusson et al. (2005) and Miller (1959).
21It is important to note that participants decided for the first time in the fourth quarter and
that the decision for the first three quarters was attributed to another retail manager in the
instructions and not to themselves. This presentation was explicitly chosen in order to reduce
a possible confirmation or status quo bias (see for instance Samuelson & Zeckhauser (1988))
although such a bias can obviously not be excluded as the status quo bias may not only be
based on cognitive dissonance.
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was also available to the participants. This table was constructed according to
the random variable X (cf. footnote 9), i.e. the table was constructed from a
censored normally distributed variable (as will be described below, one half of the
participants received a table with low variance and the other half a table with high
variance - the expected demand was held constant).
In order to ensure that participants orientate themselves according to this ran-
dom model, they were also informed that demand for the product is season inde-
pendent, but that there are differences in demand per year, and that their market-
ing research department expects a quarterly demand corresponding to our random
model, i.e. 300 units (for further details see the translated instructions in Appendix
C.1).
Altogether, participants were assigned to 10 different treatments. The treat-
ments were based on three different experimental factors that were partially crossed
over (Scheme-condition (REBATE, DISCOUNT) x Variance-condition (LOW, HIGH)
x Switch-condition (STRONG REMAIN, WEAK REMAIN,
SWITCH)).
The following table summarizes the design of the experiment composed of two
main stages. Participants were split up in two different chronologies. Half of the
participants were in a rebate scheme (A) in the first stage and had to decide whether
to switch to a linear scheme (B). The other half of the participants began with
a discount scheme (C) and had to decide whether to switch to a linear scheme
(B). After this decision they had to decide about the quantity they wanted to buy.
Once that choice was made, they were asked to make a quantity decision based
on the counterfactual, i.e. what quantity they would have chosen if they had not
decided to remain or switch. In the second stage participants were confronted with
the respective other scheme, i.e. discount instead of rebate and rebate instead of
discount.
The second experimental factor in our design was the variance of demand, i.e.
the highest possible sales during the last ten years. In both, the high and low con-
dition, the average was held constant. This was made possible by constructing the
demand table with high variance out of the low variance table by multiplying the
distance from the average over ten years (300 units) with the factor 2.22 For exam-
22Technically, such distributions can be created by taking standard-normalized values (with mean
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ple, instead of 315 units in the fourth quarter 2005 in the low variance condition
you find a value of 330 in the high variance condition.
Table 5.1: Overview of experimental treatments.
treat. (n) chronology variance optimal
1 (12) AB-CB High strong Remain
2 (12) AB-CB High weak Remain
3 (11) AB-CB Low strong Remain
4 (11) AB-CB Low Switch
5 (12) AB-CB High Switch
6 (12) CB-AB High strong Remain
7 (12) CB-AB High weak Remain
8 (12) CB-AB High Switch
9 (12) CB-AB Low strong Remain
10 (12) CB-AB Low Switch
The third experimental factor concerned the quantities of the first three quarters
that were manipulated in such a way that it would either be rational to remain
within the rebate or discount scheme, or to switch to the linear scheme.
In the first stage participants were confronted with the actual realized sales in
the first three quarters. Based on the three different treatment conditions: either
more than 2
3
(strong remain,
τ−1∑
t=1
qt = 854), exactly
2
3
(weak remain,
τ−1∑
t=1
qt = 800)
or less than 2
3
(switch,
τ−1∑
t=1
qt = 746) of the total expected demand were sold in the
first three quarters (and the rest was stocked).
If participants had chosen to continue to buy from the firm with the rebate
or discount scheme this implied that participants could either buy a sufficiently
large quantity to meet the yearly threshold in order to get an overall unit price of
(1 − α)w = 0.9 or order a lower quantity entailing an overall unit price of w = 1.
If participants choose to switch to the firm with the linear scheme, they would pay
v ≡ (1 − α)w = 0.9 per unit for the quantity bought in the fourth quarter and
w = 1 for the quantity bought in the first three quarters.
= 0 and variance = 1) and by transforming these z-values by multiplying them with a constant
a and adding a constant b in condition 1 and by multiplying with a′ (a′ > a) and adding the
constant b in condition 2. In our case, a = 25, a′ = 50 and b = 300
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After these two decisions 23 were made participants were asked to decide upon
a quantity in the counterfactual.
Following these decisions, a number was randomly drawn. The random process
corresponded to the model underlying the distribution of demand in the quarters.
The number drawn determined the maximum potential sales for the fourth quarter
at price p∗ = 1.5. Participants were paid according to their decisions. If a higher
quantity was bought than could be sold, the input costs were lost. If realized
demand could not be met because an isufficiently high amount was bought, profits
were foregone.
The second stage corresponded to the first stage, except for the scheme, that is,
those in the rebate scheme were now in the discount scheme and vice versa.
The third stage of the experiment consisted in a measurement of risk prefer-
ences.24
5.3.2 Hypotheses
Our central hypothesis (c.f. Hypothesis 1 below) is the expectation that partici-
pants in both rebate and discount schemes develop a status quo bias that a non-
behaviorally informed standard economic theory would not predict. This ‘status
quo bias consists in a high reluctancy to quit rebate or discount schemes, even
in the switch condition where it is rational to switch to the linear scheme. This
expectation is based on the assumption that participants evaluate the situation
as a sunk cost situation. If this assumption is adequate, a status quo bias in the
discount and the rebate scheme that is due to the salience of the losses if the rebate
scheme is left should be found.25
In addition to the central hypothesis, we expect a higher bias in the rebate
condition compared to the discount scheme due to discounting effects of losses over
23The two decisions refer to the price scheme and the quantity decision.
24See Holt & Laury (2002). Since exactly the same instructions translated into German were used
in order to elicit risk attitudes in the present experiment, we do not replicate the instructions
here.
25Note that this is likely to be more pronounced in the field than in our experiment where
participants had no influence on sales. With the possibility to influence sales at a given price,
the perception that the threshold is within reach may be further strengthened.
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time.26 In the following we will motivate these expectations, that can essentially be
derived from prospect or any other theory that postulates a convex transformation
of payoffs.
In our decision tasks, we conjecture that participants consider a negative payoff,
i.e. the order payments. Therefore, we expect that participants are focussed on the
loss-frame of the valuation function.27 In other words, we conjecture that partici-
pants focus on the prices that have to be paid. From this point of view the following
situation is salient for the participants: Either to change from the rebate/discount
scheme into a linear price scheme and thus incur “a loss” (i.e. an additional (neg-
ative) payment of 90 units) with certainty (the lost rebates/discounts for three
quarters), or to stay in the rebate/discount scheme and maintain the possibility to
reduce the payments. In both remain conditions this consideration is optimal, in
the switch condition, however, this consideration results in suboptimal decisions.
Both in rebate and in discount schemes participants have to compare the ex-
pected profits given they choose to remain in the rebate scheme with the profits
in case of a switch to the linear price scheme. In our experiment the quantity to
be ordered in τ depends only on the size of the stock in case of a switch as it is
always optimal to purchase up to the threshold in the non-linear scheme. A salient
difference between the linear price scheme and the rebate/discount scheme is that
the decision to switch to B is a decision that implies an additional cost of 90 (i.e.
0.1 × 900) with certainty. Furthermore, a switching decision allows to order the
optimal quantity without regard to the threshold. In contrast, the decision to re-
main in the rebate/discount scheme corresponds to a decision, where the quantity
ordered is not optimal but may allow higher profits through two channels. First,
a higher quantity increases expected sales (this is due to the fact that at most the
total available quantity can be sold) and second, the rebate/discount advantage
over the quantity bought in the past is not lost. Now consider the point where
expected profits in both schemes are equal, i.e. the indifference point. In our sce-
26Remember the framing difference between rebate and discount scheme, i.e. the respective risk
of either not getting the rebate (A) or having to pay back the discount already received (C).
27It is misleading to tag this part of the valuation-function as “loss-frame”. Prospect-theory
maps payoffs on subjective valuations of these payoffs. Negative payoffs are not necessarily
“losses”. For example, investments can be analyzed with prospect theory as well, for instance
in studies of the Concorde fallacy (sunk cost fallacy).
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Figure 5.2: Expected payoffs at the indifference point (
τ−1∑
t=1
qt = 784) in the low
variance condition.
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nario this point corresponds to a quantity sold in the first three quarters of the year
of
τ−1∑
t=1
qt = 784 with sτ = 116 for the low variance condition (see figure 5.2) and
τ−1∑
t=1
qt = 768 with sτ = 132 for the high variance condition (see figure 5.3).
28 Both
figures depict expected profits as a function of qoτ . The continuous function in each
figure depicts the expected profits under the linear scheme (i.e. implying a switch)
and the function with the discontinuity at qoτ = 300 represents the expected profits
under the rebate or discount scheme.
Due to identical expected profits at the indifference point, both options are on
one and the same point of prospect theory’s valuation function within the loss-
frame.29 The participant’s decision to change into the linear price scheme, where
28The optimal qoτ is calculated by taking the derivative with respect to qoτ of equation 5.3 (note
that q∗R = sτ + q
o
τ ) as the optimal order quantity under the rebate scheme is always q
o
τ = 300
in this experiment. Inserting the optimal order quantities in both expected profit equations
(5.2 and 5.3) and setting them equal yields the sales quantity
τ−1∑
τ=1
qt at which both schemes
result in identical expected profits.
29In figure 5.2 expected profits in both schemes are 546 if the corresponding optimal quantities
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Figure 5.3: Expected payoffs at the indifference point (
τ−1∑
t=1
qt = 768) in the high
variance condition.
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the optimal quantity to buy in the fourth quarter is always qot = 294 − sτ = 178
for the low variance condition and qot = 287 − sτ = 155 for the high variance
condition, is also a decision to incur a loss with certainty. In this case, the sunk
costs are eliminated and an optimal quantity for the fourth quarter can be planned.
However, the participants decision to remain in the rebate/discount scheme leaves a
chance to reduce the losses. Figure 5.4 gives the two density functions/probabilities
for the expected losses in case of remaining in the rebate scheme versus switching
if the optimal quantities are purchased (high variance condition). Expected profits
are 522 under both schemes.
Thus, our experiment gives an interesting extension of classic lottery experi-
ments, because the choice to remain in the rebate/discount scheme does not merely
consist in either paying a fixed amount with probability ρ or paying another fixed
value with probability 1 − ρ, but that both the area of lower profits and the area
of higher profits are partly continuously distributed.
Hypothesis 1: In line with prospect theory we expect risk-seeking behavior
are purchased. In figure 5.3, expected profits are 522.
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Figure 5.4: Choice at the indifference point under the high variance condition.
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Note: The solid cumulative density function represents the linear price scheme. It jumps
at 543. The area under this cumulative density function to the left of 543 is 0.4 and 0.6
to the right. The dashed cumulative density function represents the non-linear scheme.
at the indifference point, because losses loom larger than gains. Therefore, given
two price schemes A (or C) and B such that rational actors should be indifferent
between the two options, we expect a preference for choosing option A or C - the
rebate or discount scheme - because in this case losses (i.e. a higher price for the
units of the first quarters) have not yet been realized and the chance to compensate
losses by gains is maintained. We expect that this tendency is strong enough to
find a reluctancy to switch to the linear price scheme even if this were the optimal
choice. In other words, we expect that a substantial proportion of participants in
the switch condition remain within the rebate or discount scheme, although this is
not an optimal choice and that this proportion is above a common error level. We
also expect that participants in the two remain conditions have a strong tendency
to remain in the rebate or discount scheme.
The analysis so far does not allow distinct predictions for rebate and discount
schemes. The analysis is also independent of the exact point participants focus on
as long as they are in the “loss-frame”. This makes our predictions rather general
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and robust against differences in anchors. Our interpretation of prospect theory’s
valuation function is non-parametric and does, therefore, not entail any estimation
of parameters.30 As a result, any arbitrary convex transformation of payoffs would
yield the same predictions.
Hypothesis 2: The following hypothesis is much more sensitive with respect
to foci (i.e. salient features) that are set within the instruction set. It is derived
from the TOV model due to Mowen & Mowen (1991) who conjecture that both,
gains and losses are discounted over time. As a consequence, the moment in time
where losses are realized is relevant. According to our time framing hypothesis we
expect stronger effects in rebate than in discount schemes because in the former
losses are immediate, whereas in the latter there is a time lag between the decision
and the loss.31 In other words, the price v ≡ (1− α)w is paid right from the start
in discount schemes whereas in rebate schemes a price w > v is paid.
An alternative explanation could postulate different anchors of discount com-
pared to rebate schemes within the valuation function of prospect theory. In this
case, the assumption is that in case of the rebate scheme the participants have
invested to earn the rebate. This would be sunk costs and this is why they should
stick to their earlier decision, whereas in case of the discount scheme they risk
an additional out of pocket payment. This should lead to risk-averse behavior
and higher orders. Based on our setting, such different anchors are implausible,
because we tried to prevent the sunk-cost-phenomenon as much as possible by in-
structing participants that they are new in the firm and make their decision for the
first time (cf. footnote 21). Furthermore, this hypothesis does not imply an exact
prediction of the strength of the effects of the discount-scheme compared to the
rebate-scheme, because in both cases participants should buy more and the loss
aversion in case of the discount-scheme should lead - seemingly paradoxically - to
risk-seeking behavior, i.e. increased orders to prevent from losses. In summary, this
type of explanation postulates two different mechanisms that are at work in case of
the discount-scheme compared to the rebate-scheme, but both mechanisms lead to
30We only need the properties of the shape of the function not its functional form.
31Note, that although this time lag might be relevant in practice, in our experiment this lag
consisted in 1) the understanding of the instructions and thus the imagined time lag and 2) in
a minimal lag in the discount condition because the loss is not immediate but only becomes
apparent with the next feedback form the participant receives.
92
5.3 The Experiment
similar effects and estimating such effects requires an exact parametrization of the
mechanisms. On the other hand, TOV allows clear comparisons between rebate
and discount schemes and makes clear predictions. We expected corresponding
effects in our experiment.
Hypothesis 3: Besides the hypotheses mentioned above, we were also tenta-
tively interested in the influences of risk-seeking and risk-averse behavior in such
price schemes. Therefore, we introduced an experimental variation of variances.
We also used a test that measures risk attitudes. Measuring risk preferences is also
important from a theoretical point of view because neoclassical theory now typi-
cally involves conditional predictions that depend on risk attitudes.32 Due to the
fact that higher variances incorporate higher risks we should find some differences
between the situation with a high variance compared to the situation with a low
variance, because risk-aversion should be more pronounced in the situation with a
high variance.
5.3.3 Experimental Results
Besides the general confirmation of our hypotheses we found a high amount of
suboptimal decision making, leading to a high “noise”-rate. Given the complexity
of the task, this is not overly surprising. The total error rate of suboptimal switches
(instead of remaining) and suboptimal remaining (instead of switching) is 29%
(N = 118) in the first stage, 27% (N = 118) in the second stage and 28.0%
(N = 236) overall.33 A total of 8 participants, that is, 6.78% (N = 118) of all
participants made mistakes in both stages, 26 participants, that is, 22% (N = 118)
made mistakes in the first stage and slightly less, 24 participants, that is, 20.34%
(N = 118) in the second stage. Considering participants that at any moment
32It is not clear, however, whether such attitudes should be understood as a personal trait or as
a disposition mostly triggered by the situation (i.e. a personal state).
33In a follow up study we would adapt our instructions by making it more salient that there
may be good contextual reasons for the order strategies of the predecessor such as capacity
constraints or simply that it was reasonable to order from A or C because the alternative firm
could not offer this price from the beginning. Ex post we believe that some of our participants
may have been irritated by the fact that the alternative firm offers the same price without any
further conditions for the fourth quarter and that no plausible explanation for the ordering
behavior in the previous quarters was given. If this conjecture is right, reactance may have
caused at least part of the high noise-rate.
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during the experiment either remained in the non-linear scheme and ordered less
than 300 or switched and ordered more than 300, as inconsistent, 26 participants
of 118 fall in that category.
Our central hypothesis concerns status quo biases created by rebate or discount
schemes. In the weak remain condition we found only 11 participants, that is,
45.83% (N = 24) that switched to a linear price scheme while in the strong remain
condition only 18 participants, that is, 38.3% (N = 47) switched at least once.
Furthermore, we expected that the error rate is even higher in those cases where
it would be optimal to switch from a rebate or discount scheme into the linear
price scheme. Indeed, in this case 29 participants, that is, 61.7% of all (N = 47)
participants remained at least once in the rebate or discount scheme although it
would have been optimal to switch to the linear price scheme.
Result 1: Testing the independence of the rates of optimal or suboptimal be-
havior and the switch-conditions (where it is either optimal to stay or optimal to
switch) using a 3 and a 4 category measure34 yields a weakly significant result
(p ≤ 0.091; two-sided; N = 118) based on a Fisher exact test for the 3 categories
measure and a weakly significant result (p ≤ 0.080; two-sided; N = 118) based on
a Fisher exact test for the 4 categories measure.35
A more detailed analysis of the switch conditions comparing strong remain vs.
switch yields a significant result in the 3 categories measure (p ≤ 0.028; two-
sided; N = 118) and a weakly significant result in the 4 categories measure (p ≤
0.064; two-sided; N = 118) using a Fisher exact test.36 Therefore, it could be
demonstrated that besides the high error rates that can be observed in our scenario
we find a status quo bias that keeps participants from switching into the linear
34In order not to violate independence requirements in the statistical analysis, the data cannot
simply be pooled but optimal and suboptimal behavior in both stages has been coded in the
following two ways. In the 3 categories measure there are participants who never switched,
those who switched twice and those who switched once. In the 4 categories measure, a further
distinction between participants who switched once is made based on in what stage the switch
occurred.
35The corresponding χ2 tests yield (χ2 = 8.465; p ≤ 0.074; N = 118) based on the 3 categories
measure and (χ2 = 11.596; p ≤ 0.069; N = 118) based on the 4 categories measure; both
weakly significant.
36The corresponding χ2 tests are (χ2 = 7.342; p ≤ 0.026; N = 118) and (χ2 = 7.343; p ≤ 0.062;
N = 118).
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scheme.
Result 2: We could not find a higher “attraction” effect within the first stage
rebate condition compared to the first stage discount condition (34.78% versus
41.67%, N = 47).37
Result 3: A closer look at the variance conditions also yielded the interesting
result, that errors are more frequent in the high variance condition. Whereas in
the low variance condition 47.83% of all participants made a mistake neither in
the first nor in the second stage, only 29.17% of participants were error free in
the high variance condition.38 This could be attributed to the fact that a higher
available quantity is subjectively perceived as being more attractive under high
variance of demand because it reduces the perceived risk of not being able to fully
serve demand.
Result 4: With respect to risk preferences, we were unable to find any correla-
tion between decisions in the main experiment and the particular risk attitude test
applied, suggesting that risk preferences are a state rather than a personal trait.
5.4 Conclusion
In the experiment conducted we found that discount and rebate schemes as de-
fined in this paper exert an “attraction” on participants. This status quo bias is
in line with prospect theory or any alternative theory that postulates a convex
transformation of payoffs.
The experimental findings presented indicate that standard economic theory
relying on risk neutral profit maximizing behavior tends to underestimate the effects
of rebate and discount schemes on customer behavior. This is in line with recent
experimental findings in Operations Research analyzing single period stochastic
inventory problems. In the experimental literature on the newsvendor problem
with low profit products procurement quantities were also found to be higher than
37Note that in order not to violate independence, the first and second stage cannot be pooled. As
second stage results are potentially influenced by first stage decisions, the comparison focusses
on the first stage. The percentages of the second stage, arguably made by more experienced
participants, do, however, suggest a higher “attraction” effect within the rebate condition
compared to the discount condition (45.84% versus 26.09%, N = 47).
38Note, however, that neither the Fisher exact, nor the χ2 test are significant.
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expected profit maximizing quantities.
Concerning the external validity of these findings one has to bear in mind, for
example, that the analysis focusses on individual decision-making whereas deci-
sions in firms are typically the outcome of a corporate decision-making process.
Whether a corporate decision-making process improves or reduces “rationality” re-
mains highly debated in the literature and appears to depend largely on the exact
circumstances of the process. Based on the strength of the effects found, we would,
however, be surprised not to encounter similar decision patterns in a corporate
environment.
Finally, we believe that part of the recent surge in non-linear pricing especially
in relations with non-professional buyers may be due to the behavioral effects iden-
tified in this paper. If empirical evidence of a status quo bias in certain non-linear
pricing schemes is further corroborated, such effects may not only play an impor-
tant role in the design of pricing schemes but should also be taken into account in
the design of consumer protection and competition policy. An interesting exten-
sion of this paper would be to experimentally distinguish between a (possibly less
pronounced) status quo bias in a linear scheme versus the “attraction” exerted by
the non-linear schemes discussed.
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A.1 Choices in all Dyads
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A.2 Instructions
[In All Treatments]
Note:
• You have 5 minutes to read the instructions. If you have any questions
after you have read the instructions, please contact one of the experimenters.
Communication with other participants is not allowed during the experiment.
• After the 5 minutes you will be asked to fill out a test questionnaire about the
experiment you will be part in. Once all participants have correctly answered
all questions, the experiment will start.
• After completion of the experiment you will be asked to complete a comput-
erized questionnaire
• Please do not leave your seat before you have filled out the questionnaire and
your terminal number has been announced
The experiment:
The experiment consists of a decision situation in which you and another person
will choose between A and B for 40 periods. Your position as well as the person you
are interacting with is randomly assigned to you at the beginning of the experiment.
The decision situation, as well as the person you interact with is identical in each
period. You will see the decision made by the other person in each period after
you made your own decision.
In each period, by deciding between a choice of A or B, you can decide the
amount of Taler that you and the other person will receive. The following graph
depicts the decision screen, you will see during the experiment.
In the left half you see the consequences of your own two decision options and
below your decision buttons.
In the right half of the screen you see the decision options of the other person.
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[In the LOW treatment only]
The amount of Talers you earn in each period depends on your and the other
persons decision:
• If you choose A and the other person as well, you both receive 8.
• If you choose B and the other person as well, you both receive 4.
• If you choose A and the other person chooses B, you receive 0 and the other
person receives 12.
• If you choose B and the other person chooses A you receive 12 and the other
person receives 0.
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[In the HIGH treatment only]
The amount of Talers you earn in each period depends on your and the other
persons decision:
• If you choose A and the other person as well, you both receive 12.
• If you choose B and the other person as well, you both receive 6.
• If you choose A and the other person chooses B, you receive 0 and the other
person receives 18.
• If you choose B and the other person chooses A you receive 18 and the other
person receives 0.
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[In the ASYM treatment for the low-type player only]
The amount of Talers you earn in each period depends on your and the other
persons decision:
• If you choose A and the other person as well, you receive 8 and the other
person receives 12.
• If you choose B and the other person as well, you receive 4 and the other
person receives 6.
• If you choose A and the other person chooses B, you receive 0 and the other
person receives 18.
• If you choose B and the other person chooses A you receive 12 and the other
person receives 0.
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[In the ASYM treatment for the high-type player only]
The amount of Talers you earn in each period depends on your and the other
persons decision:
• If you choose A and the other person as well, you receive 12 and the other
person receives 8.
• If you choose B and the other person as well, you receive 6 and the other
person receives 4.
• If you choose A and the other person chooses B, you receive 0 and the other
person receives 12.
• If you choose B and the other person chooses A you receive 18 and the other
person receives 0.
[In all treatments] After each period you will be given information on: your last
decision, the last decision of the other person, the number of Talers you earned in
the last period, and the total number of Talers you have earned so far.
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Payment:
The total number of Taler earned will be paid out anonymously to you at the
end of the experiment 1 Taler corresponds to 0.04 Euro.
Thank you very much for your participation!
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A.3 The Computerized Questionnaire
Question Question
1 Terminal number?
2 Major?
3 Job?
4 Semester?
5 Age?
6 Sex?
7 Did you ever take a microeconomics course?
8 Did you ever take a game theory class?
9 Please describe briefly the reasons for your choices
10 Did your decision behavior change during the experiment? If yes, how?
11 I believe that the main goal of this experiment was to maximize my
own advantage [I fully agree, I strongly disagree]
12 I believe that the main goal of this experiment was to maximize the
group advantage [I fully agree, I strongly disagree]
13 What daily life situation did this experimental situation remind
you of the most?
14 You now have the opportunity to formulate any additional
comments, suggestions or criticism you may have
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A.4 Test Questions
• How high is the profit of the other person, if she chooses A and you too?
• How high is your profit, if you choose B and the other person A?
• How high is the profit of the other person, if she chooses A and you B?
• How high is your profit, if you choose A and the other person too?
• How high is the profit of the other person, if she chooses B and you too?
• How high is your profit, if you choose B and the other person too?
• How high is the profit of the other person, if she chooses B and you choose
A?
• How high is your profit, if you choose A and the other person chooses B?
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B.1 The Written Instructions For Treatment Cng
Note:
• You have 5 minutes to read the instructions. If after reading the instructions
you have any question, please contact one of the experimenters. Communi-
cation with other participants is not allowed during the experiment.
• After the 5 minutes you will be asked to fill out a test questionnaire about
the experiment. Once all participants have correctly answered all questions,
the experiment will start.
• After completion of the experiment you will be asked to fill out a computerized
questionnaire.
• Please do not leave your seat before you have filled out the questionnaire and
your terminal number has been announced.
The experiment: The experiment is composed of two phases.
In phase I you have the choice between two experimental situations. Both ex-
perimental situations have the following in common:
• You play during 20 periods with another person. The decision situation, as
well as the other person are identical in each period.
• You have to choose between A and B in each one of the 20 periods.
• The amount of Talers you earn in each period depends on your decision, and
the decision of the other person.
• In each period, you will not know the choice of the other person before you
have made your own choice.
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• After each period you will be given information on: your last decision, the
last decision of the other person, the number of Talers you earned in the last
period, and the total number of Talers you have earned so far.
Particular to Decision Situation I:
Every period you will have the opportunity to decide how many Talers
you give to yourself and how many Talers you give to the other person
by choosing between A and B. The Talers you earn in one period are
determined by the amount of Talers you give to yourself plus the amount
of Talers the other person gives to you. The other person faces exactly
the same decision situation.
• If you choose A you give 0 to yourself and 300 to the other person.
• If you choose B you give 100 to yourself and 0 to the other person.
• If the other person chooses A, he/she gives you 300 and 0 to
him/herself.
• If the other person chooses B, he/she gives you 0 and 100 to
him/herself.
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Particular to Decision Situation II:
• If you choose A and the other person as well, you both get 300.
• If you choose B and the other person as well, you both get 100.
• If you choose A and the other person chooses B, you will get 0 and
the other person will get 400.
• If you choose B and the other person chooses A you will get 400
and the other person will get 0.
In Phase II after you have decided what experimental situation you
would like to participate in, you will be randomly paired with a partic-
ipant who choose the same experimental situation.
In case the number of participants who choose a particular experimental
situation is odd, a randomly determined participant will have to leave
the experiment. This person receives Euro 4.
Payment:
You will be privately paid on the basis of the total Talers accumulated
in all the experiment. 1000 Taler equal 2 Euro.
Thank you very much for your participation!
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C.1 Instructions
[all]
In the following experiment you will be in the role of a newly hired
procurement manager of a retailer for the year 2005. This retailer
sells a product of daily use. The sales of the product are not subject
to seasonal fluctuations. There are no indications for changes in the
market. Your role consists in generating profits for the retailer in the
year 2005. Your sales price is fixed at 1,50 ECU. Your remuneration in
this experiment is based on the profits of the retailer transformed into
Euro based on an exchange rate. Given that the sales price is given,
the procurement price (see section I) and the sales quantity (see section
II) is crucial in determining profits.
I. PROCUREMENT
[Instructions CB only]
You have the choice between firm C and firm B to procure the product.
Firm C offers a discount of 10% and B offers a constant price.
Firm C offers the following discount: The discounted price per unit is
0,90 ECU. If you procure at least 1200 units from that firm within the
year, you do not have to repay the discount of 0,10 ECU per unit, that
you would otherwise have to repay for every unit received at discounted
price.
[Instructions AB only]
You have the choice between firm A and firm B to procure the product.
Firm A offers a rebate of 10% and B offers a constant price.
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Firm A offers the following rebate: The price per unit is 1,00 ECU.
If you procure at least 1200 units from that firm within the year, you
receive a rebate of 0,10 ECU per unit for all units bought within the
year, otherwise your price remains at 1,00 ECU per unit.
[all]
Firm B offers the following price: Irrespective of the quantity you pro-
cure within the year, you always pay 0,90 ECU per unit.
As new manager of procurement in your retail company, you decide for
the first time in the 4th quarter 2005 from what company you would
like to order and how many units you would like to order. For your
decision it is important to note that 900 units where bought from
[Instructions CB only]
Firm C in the first three quarters at the preliminary price of 0,90 ECU.
Examples:
• If you decide to procure 300 units from firm C in the 4th quarter,
you pay 270 ECU for the last 300 units. For the total year, you
have procured 1200 units and paid 1080 ECU.
• If you decide to procure 300 units from firm B in the 4th quarter,
you pay 270 ECU for the last 300 units. Since overall you bought
less than 1200 units from firm C, you have to repay the discount
of 90 ECU to firm C. For the total year, you have paid 1170 ECU.
• If you decide to procure 150 units from firm C in the 4th quarter,
you pay 135 ECU for the last 150 units. Since overall you bought
less than 1200 units from firm C, you have to repay the discount of
105 ECU to firm C. For the total year, you have paid 1050 ECU.
• If you decide to procure 150 units from firm B in the 4th quarter,
you pay 135 ECU for the last 150 units. Since overall you bought
less than 1200 units from firm C, you have to repay the discount
of 90 ECU to firm C. For the total year, you have paid 1035 ECU.
[Instructions AB only]
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Firm A in the first three quarters at the preliminary price of 1 ECU.
Examples:
• If you decide to procure 300 units from firm A in the 4th quarter,
you pay 300 ECU for the last 300 units minus the rebate of 10%
on all 1200 units. This is a rebate of 120 ECU. As a result you
have to pay 180 ECU for the 300 units bought in the 4th quarter.
For the total year, you have procured 1200 units and paid 1080
ECU.
• If you decide to procure 300 units from firm B in the 4th quarter,
you pay 270 ECU for the last 300 units. Since overall you bought
less than 1200 units from firm A, do not qualify for the rebate.
For the total year, you have paid 1170 ECU.
• If you decide to procure 150 units from firm A in the 4th quarter,
you pay 150 ECU for the last 150 units. Since overall you bought
less than 1200 units from firm A, you do not qualify for the rebate
offered. For the total year, you have paid 1050 ECU.
• If you decide to procure 150 units from firm B in the 4th quarter,
you pay 135 ECU for the last 150 units. Since overall you bought
less than 1200 units from firm A, you do not qualify for the rebate
offered. For the total year, you have paid 1035 ECU.
[all]
II. SALES
As procurement manager you have to estimate how many units you will
be able to sell and procure units accordingly. In the appendix you find
quarterly demand information of the last 10 years. During the exper-
iment you will receive the sales information of the first three quarters
of 2005. After your decision you will be informed about demand in the
fourth quarter. As mentioned before, 900 units have been procured in
the first three quarters of 2005. This corresponds to 300 units per quar-
ter as calculated by your market research department. Despite demand
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fluctuations in every quarter demand is expected to be 300 units on av-
erage per quarter. Your market research department could not identify
seasonal fluctuations and there exists no pattern in yearly fluctuations
either. Concerning your quarterly demand, you should therefore orient
yourself on a sales volume of 300 units irrespective of any information.
At the beginning of 2005 your stocks were empty. If demand in the
first three quarters was below 900 units you have stocks. It is now your
task to decide from what firm to buy and how many units to buy there
based on information on sales and current stocks
III. PROFIT CALCULATION
Profit is calculated from yearly procurement and sales. The number of
sold units is multiplied with the sales price of 1,50 ECU. In order to
obtain the profits, the costs of all procurement are deducted from that
amount. Positive stocks are lost at the end of the 4th quarter.
If you do not have any further questions, please click on START. You
will then be asked to fill out control questions
Once you have answered the control questions, please wait until the
experiment is started.
The sales situation in the last 10 years was:
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[all High Variance]
year quarter demand (highest possible sales)
1996 1 276
2 54
3 540
4 30
1997 1 126
2 252
3 552
4 192
1998 1 474
2 54
3 336
4 570
1999 1 90
2 210
3 324
4 132
2000 1 504
2 540
3 366
4 228
2001 1 462
2 420
3 288
4 228
2002 1 582
2 312
3 282
4 360
2003 1 492
2 438
3 0
4 378
2004 1 18
2 336
3 360
4 330
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[all Low Variance]
year quarter demand (highest possible sales)
1996 1 288
2 177
3 420
4 165
1997 1 213
2 276
3 426
4 246
1998 1 387
2 177
3 318
4 435
1999 1 195
2 255
3 312
4 216
2000 1 402
2 420
3 333
4 264
2001 1 381
2 360
3 294
4 264
2002 1 381
2 360
3 294
4 264
2003 1 396
2 369
3 150
4 339
2004 1 159
2 318
3 330
4 315
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